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In brief
• Housing is essential to the well-
being and development of most 
societies. It is a complex asset, 
with links to livelihoods, health, 
education, security and social and 
family stability. Housing is also an
extremely vulnerable asset, and the
destruction of homes or their loss
through displacement or dispossession
is one of the most visible effects of 
conflict and natural disaster. 
• This paper argues that housing 
reconstruction should be a more 
prominent part of programming after
conflict and disaster. Housing 
interventions face significant challenges
that cannot simply be wished away. 
But if agencies are going to continue 
to do housing reconstruction in the
aftermath of conflict and disaster, then
there is a clear need to find ways of
doing it better. 
• This paper reviews experiences in
housing reconstruction in the aftermath
of natural disaster and conflict. It offers
guidance on how to plan and prepare for
a housing reconstruction intervention;
describes the various housing recon-
struction approaches available; and sets
out the various models of implementa-
tion that tend to be used. 
Humanitarian Practice Network (HPN)
Overseas Development Institute
111 Westminster Bridge Road
London, SE1 7JD
United Kingdom
Tel: +44 (0)20 7922 0331/74
Fax: +44 (0)20 7922 0399   
Email: hpn@odi.org.uk
Website: www.odihpn.org
Layout and production: Publish-on-Demand Ltd
Printed and bound in the UK
ISBN: 0 85003 695 X
Price per copy: £4.00 (excluding postage and packing).
© Overseas Development Institute, London, 2003.
Photocopies of all or part of this publication may be made providing that the source is acknowledged. Requests
for the commercial reproduction of HPN material should be directed to the ODI as copyright holders. The Network
Coordinator would appreciate receiving details of the use of any of this material in training, research or pro-
gramme design, implementation or evaluation.
About the author
Sultan Barakat is a Senior Lecturer and Director of the Post-war Recovery and Development Unit (PRDU) at the
University of York, UK.
Acknowledgements
The author is grateful to the members of the peer review group for this paper, who gave generously of their
time to attend meetings and read through and comment on various drafts: William Carlos, Development
Cooperation Ireland; Tom Corsellis, University of Cambridge; John Cosgrave, Consultant; Professor Ian Davis,
Consultant; Jolyon Leslie, Consultant; Graham Saunders, Catholic Relief Services;  Charles Setchell, USAID;
Hans Skotte, Norwegian University of Science and Technology; Professor Roger Zetter, Oxford Brookes
University; Dan Lewis, UN-Habitat; Chris Hutton, UN-Habitat; and Esteban Leon. Thanks also to Victor Tanner
and Ghassan Elkahlout; to Rebecca Roberts for her research assistance; and to Gareth Wardell for editorial
assistance.
This Network Paper was made possible by a special grant from Development Cooperation Ireland.
iChapter 1 Introduction 1
Scope 2
Audience 3
Chapter 2 Preparation, planning and assessment 5
Introduction 5
Initial steps 5
Assessing local needs and capacities 8
Targeting assistance and beneficiary selection 10
Legal questions 13
Chapter 3 Approaches and technologies 15 
Temporary and transitional housing 15
Housing repair 17
Constructing new housing and settlements 18
‘Building-yard’ approach 23
Finance facilitation 25
Sustainability and technology transfer 26
Chapter 4 Implementation 31
The contractor model 31
The self-build model 33
Cooperative reconstruction 34
Handover and maintenance 35
Conclusion 37
Guiding principles 37
Contents
housing reconstruction after conflict and disaster
List of boxes
Box 1: Housing as a right 2
Box 2: Community participation in post-earthquake housing reconstruction in El Salvador 6
Box 3: Damage assessment criteria in Kosovo 9
Box 4: Community contributions in Goma 10
Box 5: Identifying beneficiaries according to vulnerability 11
Box 6: Selecting beneficiaries: the Philippines’ core shelter programme 11
Box 7: Forms of ownership 12
Box 8: Verifying land ownership in Kosovo 12
Box 9: Land and property laws in Rwanda 12
Box 10: Emergency shelter and semi-permanent housing: experiences from Gujarat 15
Box 11: Politics and shelter after the Marmara earthquake 16
Box 12: Rehabilitating community facilities in Croatia 16
Box 13: Transitional housing in Goma 17
Box 14: Housing repair kits in Kosovo 18
Box 15: Community solutions following the Gujarat earthquake 21
Box 16: Prefabricated solutions in Montserrat 21
Box 17: Prefabricated refugee settlements in Croatia 22
Box 18: Prefabricated core houses in Azerbaijan 22
Box 19: Rehabilitating housing and schools for a returning population in Jaffna, Sri Lanka 24
Box 20: Training local builders: the Dhamar Building Education Project in Yemen 24
Box 21: Relocation or reconstruction on the same site? 27
Box 22: Disaster mitigation in Vietnam 28
Box 23: Sustainable straw bale housing, Belarus, 1994–2000 28
Box 24: Tendering and contracting procedures 32
Box 25: Contractor-build reconstruction in Yemen 32
Box 26: Owner-driven housing reconstruction in Gujarat 33
Box 27: Community participation: lessons from the Maharashtra earthquake 34
rehabilitation programme
Box 28: Self-help housing in the Balkans, 1993–2000: SIDA’s experience 35
Box 29: Self-help reconstruction in Colombia 36
ii
Housing is essential to the well-being and
development of most societies. It is a
complex asset, with links to livelihoods,
health, education, security and social and
family stability. Housing acts as a social
centre for family and friends, a source of
pride and cultural identity, and a resource
of both political and economic importance.
Housing is also an extremely vulnerable
asset, and the destruction of homes or their
loss through displacement or disposses-
sion is one of the most visible effects of
conflict and natural disaster. Almost 80,000
houses were destroyed or damaged by
Hurricane Mitch in 1998, leaving some
300,000 Central Americans homeless. The
Gujarat earthquake in India in January 2001
left almost a million families without
homes. During the Kosovo conflict, a third
of the province’s housing stock was
destroyed, while war in Sierra Leone saw the destruction
of an estimated 300,000 houses, leaving over a million
people displaced. Disasters have a greater impact on the
built environment of developing countries than industri-
alised ones. According to the World Bank, losses due to
natural disasters are 20 times greater in developing coun-
tries than in developed states.
This paper argues that housing reconstruction should be a
more prominent element in post-conflict and post-disaster
programming than is currently the case. There is no
agency devoted to housing reconstruction, and very few of
the major NGOs working in relief would claim to specialise
here. Where reconstruction programmes are attempted,
the particular challenges that they pose tend to be under-
estimated; planning is often poor and coordination
between agencies difficult. Opportunities to enhance post-
disaster recovery efforts or introduce mitigation measures
are usually overlooked, and little or no distinction is made
between the provision of physical shelters and the provi-
sion of homes. Lack of experience leads to assessments
that do not provide the relevant information, and projects
that are impractical and appropriate neither to what bene-
ficiaries need, nor to what they want. As a result, recon-
struction projects are often unsustainable: at best, houses
are remodelled by their occupants; at worst, they are
simply rejected and abandoned.
Why, if housing destruction is such a major consequence
of disasters and conflict, is its reconstruction such a poor
relation in the relief aid enterprise? Part of the answer lies
in the way that assistance is understood, funded and
organised. Housing reconstruction is often construed as a
developmental responsibility rather than properly a
humanitarian concern, and consequently tends to be low
on the humanitarian agenda. Arguably, there is a clear
humanitarian imperative to provide victims of conflict and
disaster with basic shelter, in the same sense as there is a
humanitarian imperative to ensure access to water, sanita-
tion, food and healthcare. The humanitarian justification
for housing reconstruction is more problematic.
Reconstruction looks like development business: it delib-
erately sets out to re-establish lost assets, or even to
provide better, more robust accommodation than existed
prior to the disaster event. It aims, not just to alleviate an
immediate threat, but to restore or improve a disaster-
affected individual’s situation over the long term. Unlike
other relief items such as food aid or medicine, housing is
a significant, long-term and non-consumable asset; in
Latin America, households need 5.4 times their annual
income to purchase a house. In Africa, the average cost of
a house is 12.5 times an average annual income. Housing’s
status as property typically involves more obvious ques-
tions of ownership and legal entitlement, which are
perhaps less important in other areas of relief. 
This conceptual distinction is one of the reasons why the
actual implementation of reconstruction programmes
tends to be so peculiarly difficult. Housing reconstruction
is a complex process, and success typically requires a
good deal of time and preparation. In the immediate after-
math of an emergency, this may not be available. The
urgent need to do something within a short space of time
is not conducive to good, sustainable housing reconstruc-
tion, nor is the tendency of donors to set short timeframes
for the disbursement of emergency funds. Housing inter-
ventions are often planned and implemented rapidly, and
in isolation from their political, economic or social environ-
ment. Local skills, preferences and needs tend to be
marginalised for the sake of speed, and little effort is
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made to document the philosophies, methods and
processes underpinning housing reconstruction.
Why should relief agencies contemplate doing housing
reconstruction at all? Why not meet the need for shelter
through temporary provision, and leave more permanent
solutions to the developmental sector, private businesses
or the government, once the immediate, acute disaster
phase has passed? 
It is likely that any defence of housing reconstruction as an
activity of potential humanitarian concern will touch on
notions of basic human dignity, identity and security. The
loss of a home constitutes not just a physical deprivation,
but also a loss of dignity, identity and privacy. It can cause
psychological trauma, challenges perceptions of cultural
identity, disrupts social structures and accepted social
behaviour, poses a threat to security, and has a significant
negative economic impact. In turn, housing interventions
and related activities can enhance communities’ capaci-
ties by strengthening their physical, emotional and prac-
tical abilities to resist disaster and facilitate reconciliation;
improving institutional resources and informal social rela-
tions; increasing pride and self-esteem through participa-
tory and stakeholder programming; and enabling
disaster-affected people to look forward and invest in the
future. By transferring technology and skills training and
contributing to longer-term improvements in building tech-
niques, homes may be made more robust and better able
to resist future disasters. In the wake of conflict, housing
reconstruction may be a crucial incentive to repatriation
and resettlement, and the rebuilding of communities as
part of wider efforts towards peace. Reconstruction initia-
tives may also have important governance effects. The
nature and scale of reconstruction programmes imply
institutional and governmental engagement on a poten-
tially significant scale. Procedures and institutional bodies
have to be developed to oversee programmes, distribute
resources, allocate houses and ensure building codes are
implemented.
None of these arguments implies that this type of inter-
vention will be an appropriate or practical response for an
external agency wherever there is a housing need caused
by conflict or natural disaster. While the loss of housing
can clearly constitute a humanitarian emergency, trying to
make good that loss by rebuilding homes may not be the
most suitable activity for an international humanitarian
agency. As with other emergent or ‘non-core’ areas of
activity, such as psychosocial work or education interven-
tions, there is likely to be no simple answer here; whether
an agency implements a housing reconstruction project in
the wake of a disaster or after a conflict will depend upon
a host of institutional, political, financial, logistical and
capacity issues that are beyond the scope of this paper to
explore. Housing interventions face significant challenges
that cannot simply be wished away. But if agencies are
going to continue to do housing reconstruction in the
aftermath of conflict and disaster, then there is a clear
need to find ways of doing it better.
Scope
This paper reviews experiences in housing reconstruction
in the aftermath of natural disaster and conflict. It draws
on a wide range of examples from the last two decades to
highlight the main issues and to provide examples of both
good and bad practice. It offers guidance on how to plan
and prepare for a housing reconstruction intervention;
describes the various housing reconstruction approaches
available; and sets out the various models of implementa-
tion that tend to be used. The aim is not to provide an
exhaustive technical manual; such guidelines and stan-
dards already exist, and many agencies have their own.
Rather than detailed prescription, the paper aims to paint
a broader strategic picture of the sector. It argues that
housing reconstruction interventions should take into
account local resources, needs, perceptions, expectations,
potentials and constraints. In so doing, it broadens the
discussion from responses that take into consideration the
needs of individuals and families, to responses that
consider the wider benefits to communities. It refocuses
the discussion from a single ‘house’ or shelter reconstruc-
tion to a process, thereby reintegrating housing recon-
struction into the wider recovery context.
Three important distinctions need to be made at the
outset. 
The first is between shelter and housing. This paper
understands shelter to mean provision that is intended to
be temporary, even if in practical terms structures and
communities remain in place far longer than anticipated.
Housing reconstruction is taken to mean rebuilding or
repair that is meant either to provide a permanent
solution, or to tide affected communities over until such
time as they can rebuild their homes themselves.
housing reconstruction after conflict and disaster
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Everyone has a right to adequate housing. Article 25 of the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights states that:
Everyone has the right to a standard of living ade-
quate for the health and well-being of himself and of
his family, including food, clothing, housing and med-
ical care and necessary social services, and the right
to security in the event of unemployment, sickness,
disability, widowhood, old age or other lack of liveli-
hood in circumstances beyond his control.
UNHCR defines the characteristics of ‘adequate’ housing
as: legal security of tenure; availability of services,
materials, facilities and infrastructure; affordability;
habitability; accessibility; location; and cultural
adequacy.
Box 1
Housing as a right
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The second distinction is between housing provision in
response to emergency conditions, and housing provi-
sion in ‘normal’, non-disaster situations. This paper is
concerned with the former, though it is important to
remember that housing shortages and inadequate
housing constitute a severe and pressing problem for
many societies not formally affected by disaster or
conflict. The UN estimates that around 100 million
people are without a place to live, and over one billion
are inadequately housed. In Kenya, more than half of the
urban population lives in unplanned and uncontrolled
settlements, without basic services and amenities.1 In
the Sri Lankan capital Colombo, half of the city’s people
live in slums, and some 60% of housing stock is imper-
manent.2 Insufficient or inadequate housing is part of a
wider pattern of poverty, poor healthcare and lack of
political power. Natural disasters such as flooding or
earthquakes may have catastrophic effects on housing
stock precisely because poverty or discrimination have
forced victims to live in marginal, high-risk areas, in
weak or inadequate homes, or because poor governance
has meant that building standards designed to with-
stand shocks such as earthquakes have not been
enforced.
The third distinction concerns the post-conflict and the
post-disaster experience. Housing reconstruction in both
contexts is likely to face similar constraints and challenges.
Yet it is also likely that the post-conflict environment will
throw up specific difficulties: local authorities or legal
frameworks may have collapsed; if legal records are lost,
land tenure or prior ownership may be difficult to ascertain;
if housing has been deliberately destroyed to remove partic-
ular sections of a population, its reconstruction has obvious
political repercussions that will need to be faced.
Audience
This paper is aimed primarily at the people who implement
housing reconstruction projects: programme designers
and field-level managers. However, because of the cross-
cutting nature of housing, it will also be relevant to others
involved in various aspects of housing reconstruction and
wider recovery programmes at the international level
(donor organisations, NGOs, academics); at the country
level (central governments, local authorities, local NGOs,
national suppliers) and at the local level (direct benefici-
aries, communities, community-based organisations and
local leaders and representatives).
3
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This chapter focuses on some of the key questions and
decision-making points around preparing for and planning
housing reconstruction after conflict and disaster. It does
not offer a step-by-step guide; instead, it looks at some of
the main principles and considerations involved. It
examines in detail three particular areas:
• Initial questions. These include the decision to under-
take a reconstruction programme; issues around
mapping the key actors and institutions; and the
choice of finance mechanism.
• The assessment of local needs and capacities. This
includes assessments of physical damage, as well as
judgements about what the affected community itself
can (and is willing to) contribute.
• Beneficiary selection and the targeting of assistance.
This includes important decisions about prioritisation
and beneficiary criteria.
The chapter ends with a brief look at some of the legal
issues around housing reconstruction that need to be
borne in mind in planning.
Initial steps
The initial question any agency will need to answer is
whether a housing reconstruction intervention should be
tried at all. Part of the answer is internal to the agency
itself: do we have the mandate, capacity and skills to do
this work? Does the need for housing outweigh the need
for other assistance, such as food? Is short-term provision
adequate, or are there sound reasons for a full-blown
reconstruction intervention? Who else is likely to be oper-
ating in the disaster zone, and are they likely to be better-
equipped for this work? Are we likely to be able to find
funding? What profile can we expect by doing this work,
and is our organisation better served in this respect by
proposing a different type of intervention? Are we
prepared for the kind of long-term engagement that
housing reconstruction is likely to entail?
Another part of the answer is external to the agency, and
lies with the context itself: are conditions in the target area
conducive for an intervention of this type? A key question
here is whether the disaster-affected community itself
believes that a degree of normality and stability has
returned such that housing reconstruction can be consid-
ered. Possible signs include:
• the spontaneous return of displaced people;
• efforts by disaster-affected people to repair their
houses themselves;
• early efforts to repair and reopen schools (or to
conduct educational activities on private premises);
• investment in construction;
• commercial activity, such as buying land;
• efforts to restore infrastructure;
• increased activity in the exchange of foreign currency,
however informal; and
• the restoration of institutions and facilities of local
authority.3
Deciding that conditions are right will probably be more
straightforward in post-disaster circumstances than in a
post-conflict situation. However, even in conflict it may be
possible to engage in activities designed to support recon-
struction before any formal cessation of hostilities has
occurred. It is widely assumed that reconstruction can only
begin when conflict has stopped. In fact, people often
start rehabilitating their lives, homes and livelihoods
before there is a formally-acknowledged end to a conflict.
Agencies should look for signs of recovery rather than indi-
cations that a definitive ‘post-conflict’ phase has been
reached, and so identify opportunities to support recon-
struction in ‘pockets of peace’, even though open armed
conflict may still be under way in other parts of the
country.4
If conditions are felt to be conducive, the next step is a
‘reconstruction assessment’. This should take the form of
an initial visit to the affected areas. It can have the
following objectives:
• Explore and understand the context, opportunities and
constraints that may affect the programme.
• Distil assumptions and lessons learned from other
programme experiences and examine how these might
inform reconstruction.
• Build consensus among the key actors on the need for
reconstruction.
• Identify implementation approaches and validate them
with local actors within a specific timeframe.
• Identify common aims and objectives of reconstruction.
Such an assessment should identify the extent of the need
for housing reconstruction, and inform the selection of
beneficiaries (covered in more detail below).
There are three principal areas of analysis to be explored
when conducting a housing reconstruction assessment:
1. Context analysis: to establish opportunities for, and
threats to, reconstruction initiatives, taking into
account the disaster impact, conflict, the socio-
economic situation and institutional factors.
2. Actors analysis: to establish the strengths and weak-
nesses of the various actors in undertaking reconstruc-
tion work.
Chapter 2
Preparation, planning and assessment
housing reconstruction after conflict and disaster
6
3. Sector analysis: to establish the potential and limita-
tions of the housing sector (both public and private).
Findings from this stage will dictate the shape of the rest
of the intervention, both in terms of whether further
assessments are required, and in terms of the potential for
reconstruction, and possible courses of action therein.
The assessment should also identify the key actors, to
establish what capacities exist to tackle the situation, and
what additional assistance is required. From inside and
outside the community, key actors represent capacities,
and are a resource for information, materials, expertise
and finance. To develop a sustainable, successful and
acceptable housing reconstruction programme, key actors
need to be actively involved. Their capacities can be
enhanced through partnerships and coordination.
Key actors include:
•  The community
The target community for any housing reconstruction
programme constitutes a key actor, with a crucial role to
play. Community members are diverse, and methods to
include them will need to be tailored appropriately. Certain
community members are more visible than others, and
care must be taken to involve the more vulnerable, such as
single/widowed women, the elderly, the poor and the
disabled.
It will also be important to identify where community lead-
ership lies: does the community possess elders, religious
leaders or council members who exert authority? Is leader-
ship centred around a secular organisation, such as a local
NGO or CBO, or does it lie in the local church, mosque,
temple or stupa? Finding ways to involve legitimate
sources of local authority in any reconstruction
programme is likely to be crucial, since exclusion risks a
hostile reaction. It may be necessary to organise these
community leaders into some form of committee. This may
happen spontaneously: in Mexico City following the 1985
earthquake, ‘Renovation Councils’ with elected represen-
tatives were formed for each reconstruction or rehabilita-
tion site. Although they had no legal status, these groups
provided an effective forum for community members to
represent their needs to the authorities.5
•  Local authorities
The local authorities are usually represented by district
governments and municipalities. They are often respon-
sible for providing social housing, managing utilities and
regulating land use and planning procedures. Where it
exists, they should also be the repository of statistical
information about the local population and documenta-
tion proving land ownership. This may not, however, be
straightforward; particularly in a conflict or post-conflict
situation, legitimate authority may not be self-evident, or
local authority may not exist at all.
•  Private sector
The private sector can make an important contribution to a
housing reconstruction programme. The private sector
possesses skills and resources that supplement public
services, reduce the need for imports and help to stimu-
late the local economy. It will therefore be important to
identify private-sector partners. However, it may be inap-
propriate for housing reconstruction to become a totally
commercial venture, since this could result in access to
housing being based solely on buying power. Safeguards
need to be put in place to ensure that adequate housing is
provided for those in need, not just for those who can
afford it.
•  National government
Where possible (and again post-conflict situations create
problems of their own), housing reconstruction should be
undertaken in coordination with the national authority.
Although governments may not be in a position to deliver
housing, ideally they should still retain overall responsi-
bility for setting up longer-term housing policies and
strategies. Activities are often coordinated through an
existing housing ministry, or a ministry of public works.
However, governments emerging from conflict may estab-
lish a dedicated ministry for reconstruction, which
overnight becomes the best-funded part of the govern-
ment (mostly by donors).
It is important that agencies contemplating a housing
reconstruction programme look closely at the national
picture. Which institutions are responsible for what?
Where are the overlaps? Who should be contacted? Make
sure that there is political support for the anticipated
project, both locally and nationally. In places where
reconstruction could be controversial, greater effort will
be needed to clarify the issues before the programme
begins.
In January and February 2001, two earthquakes struck El
Salvador, claiming nearly 1,200 lives and destroying over
108,000 homes. Catholic Relief Services (CRS) and
Caritas embarked on a two-year programme to provide
1,300 houses. Local communities participated in the
construction, and were given food in exchange for their
labour. The programme, which included building schools,
health centres and roads, aimed to tackle development
issues, enhance community capacities and strengthen
local participation. Communities were organised to
ensure that all residents took responsibility for the
construction of houses. This joint effort strengthened the
community, and participants claimed that feelings of
mutual solidarity had been developed.
Box 2
Community participation in post-
earthquake housing reconstruction in 
El Salvador
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•  External actors
External assistance comes in two forms, financial and
technical. Some agencies may provide only one of these,
others both. Offers of assistance are seldom made without
conditions, and these can complicate and reduce the
effectiveness of reconstruction programmes. Potential
donors need to be identified, although in the aftermath of
a high-profile conflict funding is often available before
projects are conceived. Typical donors include interna-
tional and regional development banks, bilateral donors,
and multilateral donors such as the UN agencies, the
European Commission and NGOs.
The starting-point should be to clarify the donor’s inten-
tions, and to determine which aspects of a proposed
programme can be funded, and which cannot. This is not
as straightforward as it sounds: many donors have
complex rules regarding what they will support, largely
based on a bureaucratic distinction between ‘relief’ inter-
ventions and ‘development’ programming. Clarifying the
time-scale envisaged by the donor is also important: how
long is a donor likely to remain engaged, and how quickly
must its funds be spent? Again, the more long-term nature
of housing reconstruction makes this a particularly impor-
tant question. Permanent housing projects cannot easily
be planned and implemented in the immediate emergency
period, but require more time for implementation.
The question of finance raises issues of its own. Should
funding come from external donors, from national govern-
ment, the local municipality or the target community
itself? In most cases, the majority of reconstruction costs
7
Finance Option Description Advantages Disadvantages
Outright gift Beneficiaries are given Removes the need to set up a Encourages dependency and  
houses on the basis of system to recuperate costs undermines local coping mechanisms
meeting certain conditions Allows recipients to use their Bypasses and thus weakens local 
of entitlement. The recipient assets to meet other needs institutions
has no obligation to repay Is often an imposed solution
the cost of the house The assisting agency cannot 
recuperate money for new projects
Number of houses provided is limited
Partial contribution Beneficiaries may receive Removes the need to set up a As with the outright gift, this option 
through self-help building material and/or system to recuperate costs can undermine both local capacity to
technical advice, and/or a Allows recipients to use their cope and local institutions
partial grant. They build their assets to meet other needs Materials provided may not meet the 
own house, usually on a Increases involvement and requirements or aspirations of the 
communal basis or by participation by the recipients recipients
contracting local builders Time spent on building may conflict 
with other priorities of the recipients, 
such as income generation, which may
be a vital element in family recovery
Loans There are many variations of People without resources are May encourage renters to become 
loan programmes. The most able to rebuild their homes owners
common for reconstruction and repay the loan over time Credit systems may not exist and so
is the long-term loan. Some Recipients have freedom to may need to be set up
loans may be without interest, build a house according to Loans may be a significant financial
while others apply normal their own choice burden for recipients, especially if 
interest rates Encourages independence and they have no previous experience of 
sustainability  credit systems
Loan systems are costly to administer
Many financial institutions favour only 
the most credit-worthy people and 
may demand the creditor’s house 
as a guarantee
Table 1 Advantages and disadvantages of various housing reconstruction finance options
housing reconstruction after conflict and disaster
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are paid for by the affected people themselves, and their
governments. Yet if local communities are capable of
paying for their housing reconstruction, could outside
assistance be better deployed elsewhere, perhaps for
projects clearly beyond the community’s resources? In
reality, it is likely that some form of external assistance for
the housing sector will be provided. This injection of
capital needs to be managed carefully, and as far as
possible in a way that encourages independence,
resourcefulness and sustainability.
What form should this assistance take? In a landmark 1982
book Shelter After Disaster, the UN
summarised the issues:
One of the most important compo-
nents of a post-disaster shelter
programme is its financing sys-
tem. Outright cash grants are
effective in the short term only,
and can create a dependency rela-
tionship between survivor and
assisting groups. It is far more
advantageous for both the indi-
vidual and the community to par-
ticipate in the financing of their
own shelter programmes, espe-
cially permanent reconstruction.
On the other hand, people may
have lost all their assets through
direct damage or forced migration
and they need to be helped.6
Broadly speaking, financing models
fall into three categories: 
1) Outright gift 
2) Partial support 
3) Loan. 
None of these approaches is without
problems. Whatever system is used,
it must be appropriate to the local context, open to careful
management and properly accounted for. The table on the
preceding page presents some of the advantages and disad-
vantages of these three models.7
Assessing local needs and capacities
A thorough assessment, both of needs and of capacities
and resources, is an essential part of the planning and
preparation phase for housing reconstruction. Depending
on the size of the programme, an Assessment Team can be
assembled, with the expertise of team members balanced
and tailored to reflect the multidisciplinary nature of
housing reconstruction. Local counterparts with specific
expertise should be represented. Quantitative and qualita-
tive research methods can be employed. Crucially, needs
assessment should, as far as possible, take into account
the community’s own priorities. A number of key questions
need to be addressed:
• How extensive is the damage and the degree of
destruction?
• How many people are affected?
• What are the local hazards?
• What are the sources of vulnerability (physical, social,
economic, political)?
• What is the timeframe, given the number of people to
be assisted and the weather (is winter/summer
approaching)?
• What are the appropriate
reconstruction technolo-
gies?
• How does the local form of
construction contribute to
the risk facing the commu-
nity, and what measures
can be taken to make
buildings safer?
• What other needs and
problems are perceived as
being of critical impor-
tance by the community?
• What are the special needs
of particular groups or
communities, such as
minorities?
Damage assessment is key,
and it is likely that specific
categories will need to be
developed to suit the partic-
ular context. Damage assess-
ment requires specialist
technical personnel, especially
when the objective is not
simply to quantify damage,
but to learn about how
hazards have affected build-
ings so that improvements in
materials and techniques can be included in the recon-
struction programme. This should include consultations
with residents in order to draw on local knowledge of
previous hazards. It is important to obtain the views of
women and marginal groups, and not to limit the consulta-
tion to community leaders.8
Because the local community can make a vital contribu-
tion to housing reconstruction, an assessment of local
resources is essential. This must not be limited to finan-
cial assets, but should consider all the major inputs
required for the successful implementation of a housing
project: human resources (skilled and unskilled
labour); institutional resources; community resources;
building materials; and technology. Broadly speaking,
the more resources that are available locally, the fewer
Local capacity can be crucial: 
here, local people in San Juan, Nicaragua,
rebuild their homes after Hurricane Mitch
9have to be imported. This reduces costs, contributes to
the local economy and is more likely to result in a
reconstruction programme that is culturally and envi-
ronmentally sensitive, sustainable and acceptable to
the local community.
Seven key categories of asset should be considered.10
1. Land
Housing reconstruction programmes require both the
availability of a ‘safe’ building site and security of tenure.
These two conditions must be met before any programme
can begin. Security of tenure is particularly important
when resettlement is part of the housing agenda. A
common mistake is to start the reconstruction of perma-
nent houses on the understanding that securing tenure
will follow automatically.
2. Human resources
The allocation of roles and tasks for building
programmes needs to be predicated on an assessment of
available labour resources, both in terms of potential
project staff and also within the community. The types of
labour needed may vary, depending on the particular
nature of the programme, but it could include the
following: unskilled labour, skilled builders, foremen,
contractors, experienced trainers, financial managers
and technical staff. If a self-build programme is planned
(see Chapter 4), it is particularly important that a careful
assessment is made of the community’s ability and will-
ingness to provide labour for building. An affected
community may wish to put its efforts into other activi-
ties, such as agriculture or income generation. Some
families may include single mothers or elderly couples,
who may not be able-bodied.
In Kosovo, damage assessments were conducted in order
to group houses and buildings according to the level of
damage sustained. These assessments helped to establish
the extent of the damage, the materials and resources
needed, the costs and the distribution of costs.
UNHCR and the International Management Group (IMG)
conducted their own assessments using different
methodologies. UNHCR used five categories and IMG four.
Each organisation established definitions for the categories
of damage. The use of two systems initially caused
confusion, although later it was generally accepted that the
two systems corresponded. UNHCR categories 2–5
correlated with IMG’s categories 1–4.
Box 3
Damage assessment criteria in Kosovo
UNHCR
categories
IMG
categories
1
Undamaged
2
Broken windows,
door locks and
hinges
Cut off from
electricity water
supplies
Repairable
1
5–20% damage
3
Up to 30% roof
damage
Light shelling
impact on walls
Partial fire
damage
Repairable
2
20–40% damage
4
Over 30% roof
damage
Severe fire
damage
Need for
replacement
floors
Doors and
windows
destroyed
Repairable
3
40–60% damage
5
Destroyed
Needs
reconstruction
Beyond repair
4
Over 60%
damage
Once efforts began to deal with the most damaged buildings in UNHCR category 5 and IMG category 4, the categories
had to be subdivided:
5a/4a: Destroyed but foundations in good condition
5b/4b: Destroyed, needs complete reconstruction including new foundations.9
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In Kosovo, forms like the one below, which were used to
assess housing needs and identify beneficiaries, also
asked whether members of the family possessed any
construction skills.12
3.  Institutional resources
Institutional capacity to undertake the task in hand is an
essential prerequisite, necessitating administrative
resources, as well as management and leadership.
Institutional development may be required if these are
thought to be lacking. When local NGOs and CBOs are
utilised as programme implementers, this will be an
important dimension to be considered.
4.  Community resources
Communities vary widely in their capacity to mobilise and
organise themselves for undertaking projects. It should
not be assumed, particularly in the post-conflict context,
that community participation will easily be established.
Even in stable environments, a society may have little
experience or desire to form a participatory relationship.
5.  Building materials
Building materials will need to be carefully assessed, to
ensure that they are easily available, affordable and of
sufficient quality, and that they are acceptable to the local
community. Building materials must be in keeping with
local aspirations, and it is important to consider the
economic and environmental implications of different
types of building materials.
6.  Technology
An assessment of local building techniques needs to take
into consideration the need for improving safety. Where
labour is available, training can perhaps be provided in
specialised construction techniques brought in from
outside.
7.  Financial resources
Accurately assessing public and private sources of finance
is of critical importance, including mobilising people’s own
resources (individual and collective), through loan or
credit schemes. Issues relating to the strengths and weak-
nesses of the programme’s financial management must
also be considered.
Targeting assistance and beneficiary 
selection
The budget, the number of people who can be helped, local
employment opportunities, sustainability, vulnerability to
future disasters or conflict, the availability of local
resources, the level of outside assistance and accessibility –
all of these factors influence how assistance is targeted and
beneficiaries are selected. A thorough needs assessment
will help to identify the target population for the programme
by highlighting particular areas of need, and those groups
that would benefit most from the proposed programme.
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In the aftermath of the Mount Nyiragongo eruption in
January 2002, initial meetings were held with the
affected community in Goma to establish the extent of
local resources. It was agreed that CRS/Caritas would
provide basic training and essential carpentry tools to
enable families to undertake construction work. Families
were also responsible for preparing the base of the
housing unit and assisting in unloading materials. 
The housing unit was substantial enough to provide the
basis for a longer-term home, and all families, except
those with special needs, provided contributions.
Erecting the timber frame cost $10 per unit, and the work
involved in preparing the base, unloading the materials
and fixing the plastic sheeting was equivalent to two
days’ labour at $2 a day. The project generated
contributions of $70,000, or around 10% of the material
cost of the units. The beneficiaries and their neighbours
also provided land and access. Beneficiaries, members of
their extended families, and other members of the local
community contributed 11,000 land parcels.
It was understood that families would upgrade the
housing units in their own time, using their own
resources. Improvements included providing a more
durable external enclosure in place of the plastic
sheeting, erecting internal subdivisions and installing a
solid floor. Beneficiary contributions towards the
upgrading of individual housing units ranged from $30 to
$50. Over 70% of families undertook some form of home
improvement.11
Box 4
Community contributions in Goma
How many people can you mobilise for the reconstruction:
Within the household: _____
Relatives: _____
Neighbours and friends: _____
Can you transport the materials:
Yes _____ No_____
How many of these can you carry out:
Masonry: _____
Carpentry: _____
Plumbing: _____
Electrical works: _____
What can you contribute to the reconstruction process?
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To assess which areas are to be reconstructed and the
extent of the work required, criteria have to be developed
to create uniform systems of evaluation. As the recon-
struction process continues, it may be necessary to refine
these criteria to ensure that they remain useful and
relevant. Assessment criteria facilitate transparency and
accountability, making it easier to explain difficult deci-
sions to the local community. In an ideal world, these
criteria should be developed in collaboration with the
community or community representatives and other key
actors, and used by all agencies involved. Using different
criteria can cause confusion and can lead to real or
perceived unevenness in the distribution of assistance. It
is almost inevitable that the choice of areas to be recon-
structed will create dissent among people from areas not
chosen. The best agencies can do in situations like this is
to be clear and consistent, and to make their choices care-
fully and based on as much information as possible. That
said, it should be possible to make decisions in such a way
as to minimise the consequent hostility; in post-genocide
Rwanda, for example, one village received full housing
assistance, while another, just 300 metres away, only
received roofing kits and a few doors and windows.13 It
should have been possible to anticipate the negative
impact that such a distribution pattern was likely to have.
Beneficiary identification is crucial, but it can be an expen-
sive process; one NGO active in the Knin area of Croatia,
for example, spent 22% of its housing construction budget
on identifying the target group.14 Good local knowledge
helps to identify the most vulnerable, and to ensure that
programmes are correctly targeted and acceptable to the
community. Perceptions of who is vulnerable vary
according to culture and tradition. The circumstances of
some individuals make them more vulnerable in some
societies than they would be in others. Criteria can be
developed by agencies, host communities or potential
beneficiaries themselves. The type of criteria and the
actors used to identify them will depend on the context;
Box 5 describes the criteria that were used to identify
beneficiaries in Kosovo.
Applying selection criteria can be as difficult as agreeing
them. For example, using income to determine whether a
family should be among the beneficiaries is problematic: it
is often hard to establish whether income is adequate to
meet needs; family members may be employed in
seasonal or casual labour so it is hard to estimate income;
the total joint income may still be inadequate to support
dependent relatives, but the presence of wage earners can
make a family ineligible for assistance even if that family
contains vulnerable members.17
Even finding the homeless can be a challenge. The so-
called ‘hidden homeless’ are people who have made their
own emergency arrangements and have not registered with
any agency for assistance. They may have constructed their
own emergency shelter, be living with friends or members
of their extended family or using empty buildings. The
presence of the ‘hidden homeless’ means that agencies
often plan and budget for housing programmes using inac-
curate figures. According to the Croatian Government Office
11
In Kosovo, beneficiaries were identified using the
following criteria:
• Families whose houses were destroyed and who were
living in tents, community shelters or public
buildings, or who were lodging with other families.
• Families with more than eight members and with
children under the age of 12.
• Families with elderly, disabled or chronically-ill
members.
• Families without the means to rebuild their own
home.
• Female-headed families whose husbands had died or
were disabled during the conflict.
• Families at risk from their present living conditions.
The criteria were developed by Municipal Housing
Committees composed of representatives from local and
national government, and external agencies.15
Box 5
Identifying beneficiaries according to 
vulnerability
On 25 November 1987, Typhoon Sisang hit the Philippine
coastal province of Sorsogon. Almost 200,000 homes
were destroyed. Between 1988 and 1991, the Department
of Social Welfare and Development, supported by UN
development and relief agencies and the Asian Disaster
Preparedness Center (ADPC), reconstructed 22,665
typhoon-resistant core houses.
The beneficiaries of the programme had to satisfy a set
of stringent requirements in order to be eligible. These
included:
• having a secure land title – a guarantee of ownership
or evidence of long-term occupancy of land;
• residence in an existing dwelling on the land;
• income criteria – for a family of six, monthly income
could not exceed $65 for urban dwellers, or $55 for
rural dwellers;
• the family lacked the resources to rebuild; and
• the family did not receive shelter assistance from
another agency.16
Box 6
Selecting beneficiaries: the Philippines’
core shelter programme
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for Displaced Persons and Refugees, in 1995 nearly 80% of
Bosnian refugees in Croatia were accommodated privately
or living independently.18
Conversely, false claims may sometimes be made. For
example, homeowners may ask for more materials than
they need to repair their homes and sell the surplus, or
several members of the same family will apply for housing,
although one house would be adequate for the family’s
needs. In the confusion following a conflict or disaster, it is
difficult to check details and doing so is seldom an agency
priority. In Kosovo, the countryside was awash with unfin-
ished houses from before the war. After the conflict, these
were occupied by families who then claimed that they had
been damaged during the fighting, so as to benefit from
assistance for repair and reconstruction.20 Other families
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In Kosovo, municipalities were faced with the huge task
of verifying ownership of the land before
reconstruction/rehabilitation took place. Implementing
agencies or the beneficiaries, depending on the system
in the municipality, submitted a request to the cadastre
(land records) department in the municipality. Ownership
of the land was checked with the cadastre records. If
these and any subsequent checks failed, the occupants
were asked to provide proof of ownership. Disputes were
usually resolved by the village council and witnesses, or
in the courts at a later date.
Box 8
Verifying land ownership in Kosovo
Following the 1994 genocide in Rwanda, many women
and girls became heads of families. However, traditional
customary laws prevented women from claiming their
families’ or husbands’ land and property. This meant that
they were homeless and effectively landless. In March
2000, the Rwandan National Assembly passed a law on
‘Matrimonial Regimes, Liberties and Succession’. This
landmark legislation gave women and girls the right to
inherit land and property, and legally recognised women
as household heads.21
Box 9
Land and property laws in Rwanda
Typical forms of tenure include:
Rental agreements. These are made between tenants and
private citizens, private companies or public bodies.
Tenants are allowed access to the property for a fixed
period in return for regular agreed payments. If the
agreement is made with a public body, rents are often
reduced or partially covered by public funding. Rented
property is usually occupied by low-income families and, in
developing countries, is rarely regulated. This form of
tenure is least likely to lead to capital investment in the
property, either by the tenant or the property owner.
Leasehold. Here, the tenant has access and control over
the property for an agreed period. The owner has ultimate
control, and when the lease expires may release it to the
present tenant or reallocate it to another tenant.
Freehold. This form of tenure conveys the most power to
the title-holder, who has complete control of the land and
property and may bequeath it or use it as collateral. It is
the form of tenure most associated with investment.
Conditional freehold. This is a form of leasehold which can
be converted to freehold if certain conditions are met.
However, strict terms can mean that any default in rent
payments can result in all previous payments being
forfeited, and the tenant must restart the payment process
from the beginning.
Collective tenure. Collective forms of tenure ensure secure
tenure on the basis of agreed shared access. The collective
can be a corporate body, private company, housing
association or cooperative. For such tenure to be feasible
and successful, those involved must share a high level of
common interest and be capable of managing the
arrangement.
Communal tenure. This is common in communities with a
long history and strong cultural identity. Access to land
may be governed by custom, and may include the right to
occupy, but not transfer or alienate.19
Box 7
Forms of ownership
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benefited from the reconstruction programme, but
continued to occupy or rent illegally-procured properties.
Legal questions
Legal issues of ownership and landholding have a partic-
ular relevance in the housing reconstruction sector. Laws
regarding property and land ownership and tenancy vary
from one country and region to another; because they
tend to be based on customary practice and precedent,
they can be ambiguous, contradictory and inadequate. In
many parts of the world, tenants have few rights, and
formal contracts can be rare. In post-disaster situations,
particularly after conflict, the legal framework may have
collapsed altogether, and the legal status of land and
property ownership can be particularly difficult to check.
In a protracted conflict, normal procedures break down
and land or property may be bought and sold without
registering changes in ownership. After the conflict, new
owners may have difficulty proving their right to the land
or property even if, as far as they are concerned, the
purchase was made with the consent of the original owner.
Conflict and disaster can cause massive displacement, and
families looking for shelter will occupy whatever vacant
property and land they can find regardless of any legal
entitlement to do so.
In the wake of the conflict in Kosovo, temporary laws
were introduced to allow for housing the homeless, and
methods of settling disputes were established. The
Housing and Property Directorate was mandated ‘to
supervise the utilization of abandoned property on a
temporary basis for humanitarian purposes’. A regula-
tory and operational framework was developed for the
temporary allocation of abandoned houses to individ-
uals in need, without affecting the legal rights of the
owner.22
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This chapter describes various approaches to housing
reconstruction. These employ a diverse variety of
methods, underpinned by different philosophies, each
requiring a wide range of resources and expertise. As well
as the actual reconstruction of houses, some programmes
aim to fulfil additional social, political or economic goals,
which may also influence the choice of approach. There is
no definitively right or wrong approach, but there will be a
choice which, depending on the situation, will be more
likely than others to achieve the desired aims and to fulfil
the needs of the communities in question. Indeed, it may
be beneficial to combine the best aspects of different
reconstruction strategies and the methods of financing
them. Adopting a number of approaches enables the
housing reconstruction process to yield a wider range of
benefits, recognises diversity among the potential recipi-
ents of aid, helps to maintain community diversity, and
distributes investment to reduce future vulnerabilities.
Broadly speaking, there are five distinct approaches to
post-disaster housing (though elements of several may be
combined within a single intervention):
1) Providing transitional and temporary housing.
2) Repairing damaged housing.
3) Building new housing.
4) A ‘building yard’ approach, whereby communities do
the rebuilding, but outside agencies make materials
and skills available and affordable.
5) A ‘finance facilitation’ approach, whereby communities
do the rebuilding, with financial help from outside
agencies.
Within this range, the various options pose their own chal-
lenges and meet their own, different sets of needs. Each
has advantages and disadvantages. Different approaches
are suitable for different situations, and methods which
prove successful in one area may not succeed in another.
Temporary and transitional housing
Traditionally, emergency or temporary shelter has taken
the form of plastic sheeting, tents or emergency centres
set up in communal buildings or relief camps. The driving
force behind this approach is often a perceived urgency to
shelter people before winter sets in (referred to by some
agencies as ‘winterised shelter’). Temporary shelters are
designed for use in the early months following disaster or
conflict; they are usually prefabricated, imported and
intended for use throughout the world regardless of
culture or climate. 
The need for such short-term assistance is likely to remain
a central feature of emergency responses after conflict and
disaster, particularly where large numbers of people need
help and the climate is inhospitable. Even so, there are
important disadvantages with temporary shelter provision
as generally understood. Because materials are mass-
produced, usually in another country, they are unlikely to
be adapted to the specific climate or culture of the benefi-
ciary community. The provision of temporary shelter allevi-
ates the immediate need for accommodation, which means
that permanent housing projects may be regarded as less
of a priority. As a result, short-term housing measures often
mutate into permanent, poor-quality settlements lived in
by the poor. There are also questions of cost. It is widely
accepted that providing emergency shelter can be as
expensive as permanent housing, and spending funds on
emergency provision is likely to reduce the amount avail-
able for more permanent solutions.23 Since temporary
shelter materials are almost always imported, the local
economy sees no benefit from this expenditure. Indeed,
local suppliers and factories may lose trade. 
Provision can also take time. The need to import materials
means that transport has to be organised, customs clear-
ance sought and the materials delivered to the target
community. Land has to be found to erect the accommoda-
tion, and legal arrangements might have to be made for
this. If the temporary housing is intended to provide
shelter in the medium term, it cannot be erected on sites
slated for permanent housing, which means that addi-
tional land has to be identified. This might have agricul-
tural value or be previously untouched, and is unlikely to
be returned to its natural state once the temporary
housing is no longer being used. 
External provision might not in any case be needed, at
least not in the vast quantities that sometimes arrive in a
disaster zone. Displacement might not be on the antici-
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Approaches and technologies
Following the January 2001 earthquake in Gujarat, many
people received emergency and temporary shelter only
after they had started to build permanent dwellings for
themselves. Some families now have three houses – a
temporary one, a semi-permanent one and a permanent
one. Some people have combined structures in an effort
to use them all, while delays in the provision of
permanent housing encouraged families to convert their
semi-permanent shelters into permanent dwellings by
building stone walls. The resulting hybrid structures are
unlikely to perform well in any subsequent earthquake.24
Box 10
Emergency shelter and semi-permanent
housing: experiences from Gujarat
housing reconstruction after conflict and disaster
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pated scale, or affected people might make their own
provision and not require outside help. Families may build
their own temporary shelters with whatever materials
come to hand, or they might seek refuge with relatives or
friends. In the wake of the Gujarat earthquake in January
2001, affected communities received outside help with
temporary accommodation only after they had taken steps
to provide for their own needs (see Box 10).
The provision of ‘ready-made’ emergency and temporary
housing can undermine a community’s coping mecha-
nisms, may be culturally inappropriate and may delay the
long-term recovery process. Affected communities may fear
that temporary housing will become a long-term measure,
and prefer permanent rather than temporary housing
because they feel more secure and are able to resume
normal life more quickly. Conversely, where ostensibly
temporary housing becomes effectively permanent, it may
be difficult to persuade people to move: a forced transition
to permanent housing may have political costs, as illus-
trated by the Marmara earthquake case study described in
Box 11. Moving families from emergency to temporary and
finally permanent housing increases the trauma that they
experience, disrupts the recovery process and weakens
community ties. The IFRC believes that its programmes to
provide medium-term shelters have had only limited
success, and is looking at ways to provide better-quality
emergency housing which would bridge the gap between
emergency accommodation and permanent provision, and
provide a more effective use of resources.25
One answer may be to provide materials that can be
reused. Temporary housing following the Mexico City
earthquake in 1985, for example, was recycled and used
by several families in rotation as reconstruction took place
in different parts of the city.28 Another temporary solution,
adopted by GTZ in Croatia in 1992, may be to reconstruct
or rehabilitate existing community-owned facilities that
can accommodate a number of families (see Box 12). This
may be problematic if the structure in question is impor-
tant in a community’s overall recovery, such as a school,
and so will need to return to its original use rapidly after
the emergency; it might be better to select facilities that
are no longer in use, or that were out of use for a long time
prior to the disaster or conflict. 
When agencies are faced with large numbers of
homeless people that need to be provided with housing
quickly, it should be possible to develop a more durable
transitional housing unit which beneficiaries can them-
selves improve incrementally once the immediate post-
disaster phase has passed and they are back on their
feet. This is essentially a compromise: a quick and hope-
fully cheaper option than going straight for permanent
housing, but offering possibilities of permanence further
down the line. If nothing else, this kind of approach
might get around the ‘emergency/development’ funding
restrictions that bedevil interventions like housing;
USAID, for instance, provided what was termed relief
assistance following the Nyiragongo eruption in Goma.
Under its funding rules, this meant that only plastic
sheeting could be provided for roofing, which would be
temporary, rather than tiles to make a permanent roof.
However, the framework for the roof was constructed so
that it could bear the weight of tiles. At a later date,
homeowners could replace the plastic sheeting with
tiles, using the original roof framework.
The Marmara earthquake in Turkey in August 1999 killed
more than 15,000 people and destroyed or damaged
75,000 buildings. As part of its response, the Turkish
government provided emergency shelter for the
homeless on the outskirts of towns and cities in the
region. Although the accommodation was intended to be
temporary, it is likely to have a lasting effect. Temporary
settlements were built on land that was previously
untouched or used for farming, and which is unlikely to
be restored even after the temporary settlements are
eventually demolished. The settlements themselves are
beginning to resemble other suburbs, with utilities,
shops and public transport. Inhabitants feel a sense of
ownership, beginning to modify their shelters and
establish businesses. This means that, politically,
demolishing the temporary settlements would be
unpopular. Families are settled and unlikely to move
willingly unless the permanent provisions are
significantly better than their current accommodation.26
Box 11
Politics and shelter after the Marmara 
earthquake
In 1992, GTZ rehabilitated and reconstructed a number of
communal and commercial buildings damaged by the
war in Croatia, in order to accommodate refugees from
neighbouring Bosnia. Thirty-nine buildings were
reconstructed and converted into collective shelters, with
sanitation, basic furnishings and heating,
accommodating 12,000 people. The buildings
rehabilitated included hotels, schools, community
buildings, hospitals, barracks and old people’s homes, as
well as a factory, a museum and an orphanage. The cost
per refugee amounted to €600, including incidental
expenses and overheads.27
Box 12
Rehabilitating community facilities in
Croatia
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Housing repair
In some instances, the cheapest and quickest method of
providing adequate housing is to repair the damaged
stock. This is particularly effective in situations where
there has been no significant or far-flung displacement of
the population. The scale of damage will vary, and assess-
ments are necessary to determine the materials and level
of skills needed to repair the houses. Repair, rather than
moving to emergency shelters or collective centres and
undertaking complete reconstruction, is less traumatic for
survivors, who are often able to continue occupying their
own homes. Depending on the scale of damage and avail-
able skills, people can undertake their own repairs and
return to normality relatively quickly, or houses can be
rehabilitated by contractors using assistance funds.
The Nyiragongo eruption in Goma in January 2002
destroyed 15,000 houses in two days. A housing solution
was developed which could be rapidly deployed and
erected, but which would be robust enough to be durable.
The dimensions of the housing unit and its components
were based on the standard sizes available in the
marketplace, so that materials could be sourced locally.
The minimum size of the shelter was determined by family
size. Since cooking takes place outside, the shelter did not
have to be large enough to accommodate a kitchen.
The housing units were designed to be more stable and
robust than typical shelter solutions because there was
little flat land to build them on. It was also intended that
families would be able to take down their houses and move
them to the location of their original homes once the areas
covered with lava had recovered. Initially, beneficiaries
complained that the plastic sheeting provided for the walls
offered little privacy. However, many families used the
sheeting as a backing upon which to attach other
materials. People salvaged metal sheets and timber
cladding to make more durable walls; others arranged bush
sticks vertically on top of the plastic sheeting. Floors were
covered with clay bricks or lava rock shingle. Within the
lifetime of the programme, 69% of families had upgraded
their homes. The first of the transitional housing units were
erected six weeks after the eruption; by the end of
September, 11,307 had been put up.29
Box 13
Transitional housing in Goma
Transitional units erected following the Goma eruption in 2002
©
Graham
 Saunders/Catholic Relief Services
Strengths
Provides shelter
Releases communal buildings to their original use (e.g. schools)
Supports ‘host’ families
Can be used to reduce tension
Some emergency material may be recycled (e.g. corrugated iron
sheets)
Weaknesses
Could prove expensive 
Limits participation
Culturally alien
Lacks individualism
May become permanent
Difficult to target beneficiaries
Climate may be incompatible
Table 2 Temporary and transitional solutions
Dangerous assumptions
Supplies will arrive on time
Routes will be open for transport
Little or no damage will occur during transport
This is only a temporary solution
housing reconstruction after conflict and disaster
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If damage to an area is minor, and the local community can
provide materials and resources, it is preferable for
agencies to support these activities through the provision
of advice or by subsidising materials, rather than direct
involvement. In this way, local capacities are enhanced,
not undermined, and assistance can be targeted in areas
where there is greatest need.
If it is possible to repair the damaged housing stock,
agencies may choose to provide the necessary materials in
the form of a housing repair kit, as was the case with a
number of projects implemented after the war in Kosovo (see
Box 14). Kits can be used for emergency and permanent
repairs and to target specific areas, such as roofs and
windows. Depending on community capacities, agencies
may choose to assist with labour in addition to the provision
of kits. Kits can appear to be a neat self-contained method of
providing assistance, but off-the-shelf solutions are unlikely
to meet the diversity of potential needs, so care must be
taken to ensure that they are appropriate and targeted.
The unwritten rule for housing repair is that it should rein-
state the property to its pre-disaster condition. Any
improvement or ‘betterment’ of the property should be
carried out at the owner’s expense. However, repair is often
limited to essential works necessary to ensure that the
house is habitable: structurally-indispensable works
(roofing, load-bearing walls, structural frame); sanitation
(bathroom, latrine); and cooking space or kitchen.
Depending on the climate, windows, simple doors and
internal plastering may also be considered essential works.
Housing repair may be conditional on house-owners
accommodating an additional number of displaced people
for a certain period of time (often two to three years) free
of charge. Obviously, such conditions can be implemented
more easily when allowance is made for property improve-
ments. 
Constructing new housing and settlements
The construction of new housing settlements involves a
great deal of effort and requires the highest level of invest-
ment, in relation to all other comparable reconstruction
Strengths
Speeds the reconstruction process
More houses can be repaired for less money
Demand for social readjustment is minimal 
Allows the affected population to play a major role
Effective in rural and isolated areas
Could result in more culturally-appropriate, permanent solutions
Can be used to reduce tension
Weaknesses
Kits can be an off-the-shelf solution 
Kits may end up sold on the market
Requires a certain level of skills 
Difficult to build in safety measures (mitigation) 
Could result in a loss of identity in culturally/historically 
significant settlements
Difficult to distribute and account for
Dangerous assumptions
Supplies will arrive on time
Standard kits can be used regardless of specific architecture
People know how to use the kits
The size and number of kits per family can be standardised
This is only a temporary solution
Material is available in local and neighbouring markets
Ownership is clear
Table 3 Housing repair
In post-conflict Kosovo, several agencies opted to
provide kits for roofing repair. Some contained materials
for permanent repairs, while others supplied materials
for temporary repairs. The tiles for permanent repairs
were more expensive than the temporary plastic
sheeting, but they proved to be time and labour efficient
because they obviated the need for double
reconstruction. Agencies that concentrated on providing
plastic sheeting were able to help twice as many people
as those supplying the more expensive tiles. In some
cases, the decision to provide sheeting was donor-led,
because donors had stocks of plastic sheeting but no
tiles. Although an independent evaluation concluded that
efforts to provide permanent and temporary housing
materials were both equally valid, it criticised initial
needs assessments which failed to note that many
houses were too badly damaged to be repaired with roof
kits, and those that were repairable required more
materials than were provided in the kits.30
Box 14
Housing repair kits in Kosovo
approaches, per accommodated person.31 Building settle-
ments is extremely time-consuming, requires the full partici-
pation of local authorities and may even commit them to
carry the partial or in some cases the full cost of such settle-
ments. When planning the construction of new settlements,
the following considerations must be addressed:
1. The choice of location, site selection and settlement
planning.
2. The choice of construction method and materials
(prefabricated or pre-cast, or indigenous methods).
3. The choice of design.
1. The choice of location and site selection
This is by far the most important factor in determining the
success or failure of new settlement programmes. Site
identification and selection is a time-consuming business
due to the numerous dimensions to be considered
(property rights, land use plans, exposure to hazards,
infrastructure, environmental impact, relationship to host
communities and income/employment opportunities).
One can learn a lot about location selection by observing
where displaced people themselves usually settle.
Besides physical security, access to economic and employ-
ment opportunities is the primary determinant here. This
is particularly the case when the displacement is internal
(hence people are allowed to work) and was caused by
natural disaster (hence there are less likely to be political
obstacles). When the disaster hits rural areas or poor
urban areas, people are likely to move closer to cities, and
often settle in slum areas surrounding city centres. 
One option is to build housing for displaced people on
self-settled locations. This of course will be the most
appealing choice to the displaced. However, it is problem-
atic for a number of reasons. First, people will inevitably
settle in a scattered pattern depending on the availability
of land and the willingness of the host community to share
resources with them. Second, there is a high likelihood
that there will be legal implications relating to land owner-
ship and designated use, even if the areas were already
settled before the disaster. In fact, local government may
be opposed to creating durable settlement facilities within
certain areas. Third, it becomes extremely difficult to
distinguish between disaster-displaced people and vulner-
able host communities. Both may need assistance,
although national and other external developmental
agencies may already be working with the host commu-
nity. Fourth, infrastructure (if it exists) is likely to be too
poor and already over-stretched.
A second option is to provide housing as an extension of
an existing settlement. If this proves to be politically
acceptable to the local authorities and host communities,
it has a number of advantages in facilitating integration
between the displaced population and their hosts, and in
facilitating the restoration of livelihoods, assuming that
livelihood opportunities can be extended to accommodate
the newcomers. An extension of existing settlements also
means more efficient use of existing infrastructure.
A third option is to build a completely new housing settle-
ment. Here again, the choice of location must be handled
carefully in order to ensure that the housed population
gains access to local employment markets. The smaller
the size of the settlement, the more manageable the
reconstruction and supply of basic infrastructure will be.
However, in cases where the only choice is to build settle-
ments in isolated locations, bigger settlements may be a
better option, as they could provide livelihood opportuni-
ties and may become self-sustaining in job creation.
Having said that, grouping communities from what used to
be culturally diverse smaller settlements into one or more
larger settlements has proved unsuccessful. People settle
together for a wider range of reasons than just the effi-
cient provision of services and livelihoods. Cultural, tribal,
clan and religious structures must be observed when
planning larger grouped settlements. In addition, large
settlements increase the risk of environmental degrada-
tion and social tension, and present increased mainte-
nance and management problems.
When it comes to choosing new locations, it is important
not to act as though operating in a vacuum. Most local
planning authorities will have settlement expansion and
land use concepts predating the war or disaster, and
would see reconstruction as providing an opportunity to
revive such plans. These should be considered first,
keeping in mind that they would have been predicated on
more detailed, comprehensive studies, and that ultimately
any new settlement will require the approval of the local
authorities.
2. The choice of construction method and materials
The use of local construction knowledge, skills and
material is most desirable. This allows for better mainte-
nance and thus greater sustainability, as well as enabling
incremental upgrading and expansion. The material used
is more likely to be culturally and socially appropriate, as
well as being familiar. Traditional material and techniques
are more suitable and durable in the local climate (cold,
hot-dry, hot-humid or wet environments). The use of tradi-
tional techniques allows the involvement of owners, local
builders and small contractors in the construction, thus
maximising the local economic value of the reconstruction
programme. At the same time, procuring materials locally,
often in significant quantities, can inflate prices to a level
that prohibits individuals from buying materials to do their
own repair or rebuilding work. Local markets cannot
always cope with the increased demand and stocks may
become depleted.
Radically different, new approaches to construction gener-
ally do not last beyond the end of a project, whilst building
on existing skills will allow beneficiaries to continue the
work themselves. Re-establishing traditional forms of
building, particularly in housing, helps people in the post-
disaster phase by providing some continuity. This is partic-
ularly important in settlements of special architectural or
historical value. Recycled material from damaged settle-
ments may be used as long as it is culturally acceptable to
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do so, and people do not associate the material with the
death of their relatives (some of whom may have been
buried underneath), and ownership has been clarified.
In some cases, local building materials and techniques
might have become associated with backwardness or a
lack of modernity; they may even be linked with the
hazards that resulted in disaster in the first place.
Experience has shown that, while people may know how
to build safer homes, over time investment in the house
declines, perhaps for economic reasons, and the structure
becomes more vulnerable. Dhamar in Yemen is a good
example: many older buildings survived an earthquake in
December 1982, while the majority of more recent struc-
Strengths
Culturally acceptable
Continuity
Availability
Flexibility
Low transport costs
Weaknesses
Vulnerability
External agencies’ knowledge of the community and its tradi-
tional building techniques is likely to be limited
Table 5 Strengths and weaknesses of traditional techniques
Access How near is the site to an established economic and service centre?
How good is the road?
Does accessibility vary at different times of the year?
Security What are the security risks?
How close is the new settlement to a border or other potential flashpoints?
Topography Is the site prone to hazards (flooding, high winds, seismic activity)?
and climate Is soil erosion likely?
Is the site heavily contoured?
What is the direction of the prevailing wind?
Is the water table too high (less than 3m below ground)?
Infrastructure What infrastructure reaches the site?
What extra capacity can the infrastructure take before requiring upgrading?
Who is responsible for its management and maintenance?
Ownership Who owns the land? Is it individual or collective ownership? On what basis (tribal, government)?
Acceptance What level of acceptance do the plans and sites have amongst the target groups, the host 
community and local authorities?
Is there any religious or cultural taboo associated with the use of this particular site 
(e.g. is it considered to be a graveyard)?
Space Is there sufficient space for the desired density of housing?
Is there space to provide for livelihood and employment opportunities? Trade? Agriculture?
Is there space for future extension?
Environment How is the land currently used?
What construction materials are available? Can they be used without threatening the 
environment?
Is the surrounding environment particularly valuable or vulnerable?
What are the likely impacts of increased population settlement on agriculture and livestock?
Is the site affected by environmental pollution?
Table 4 Factors affecting the selection of construction sites
tures collapsed. Both were made of heavy masonry, but
the old ones had timber reinforcement beams built into
them.
Prefabricated housing 
Prefabricated housing can be constructed quickly, and can
provide shelter for large numbers of people. This is impor-
tant when many people have been made homeless, and
there are large numbers of vulnerable people in the
community. However, it is not necessarily an ideal solution.
Prefabricated housing usually has to be imported, so does
not benefit the local economy and imposes housing
designs that may differ from the vernacular. Prefabricated
housing also has a relatively short life expectancy, and
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On the Caribbean island of Montserrat, following several
volcanic eruptions in 1995, 90% of the population had to
be evacuated and relocated. Many found emergency
shelter in public buildings, but as it became apparent that
there was no immediate solution to the housing shortage,
and that public buildings could not provide adequate
shelter in the medium term, prefabricated housing was
brought to the island. Although the housing units could be
erected quickly and addressed the primary objective of
ameliorating conditions in the temporary public shelters,
they were of poor quality; once occupied, ongoing repairs
were necessary. Oversights had been made during the
ordering process, so some components had to be ordered
specially, which caused delays and raised costs.
Prefabricated components were also used to produce
modular housing. The finished units matched expectations,
but the venture was of limited success because the
technology was inappropriate and suppliers, over which
there was no control, failed to implement quality-control
checks. Consequently, some components were heavily
corroded when they arrived, and the entire stock of wall
panels had to be replaced because of a manufacturing
defect. The high-tech system proved difficult for the local
contractors to master, so the aim of providing housing
rapidly was not met.33
Box 16
Prefabricated solutions in Montserrat
The CRS housing reconstruction programme undertaken
following the January 2001 earthquake in Gujarat
concentrated on the community-based production of
materials. The shelter programme developed:
• Large-scale community-based construction
Thirty teams of local labourers skilled in masonry and
local building techniques were formed and trained.
• Large-scale localised production
Five hundred local staff worked full-time to produce
enough compressed earth bricks for 200 housing units
each month. Compressed earth block houses are
40–50% cheaper than load-bearing cement block or
reinforced concrete frame houses.
• High-quality, appropriate and durable housing
solutions
In consultation with the Indian Bureau of Standards,
the programme helped to develop a standard for
compressed earth blocks.
The housing units met the government’s earthquake-
resistance standards, were in keeping with the local
housing style and allowed families to tailor houses to their
individual needs, creating a diverse and more interesting
living environment. Village committees identified
beneficiaries, and administrative and financial systems to
facilitate procurement of materials and logistical
procedures were established.32
Box 15
Community solutions following the Gujarat earthquake
Compressed earth bricks being produced in Gujarat
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components are often heavy and difficult to assemble
without skilled knowledge. 
Techniques have been developed to address some of the
shortcomings of prefabricated provision. To avoid
problems of cultural suitability and individuality, some
types of prefabricated component enable a family to
construct a home quickly, but allow for later modification
according to the family’s needs and wishes. Another, similar
approach is to provide a prefabricated or pre-cast ‘core
house’. The aim is to provide as many people as possible
with a foundation for rebuilding their own homes, as quickly
as possible. The core house is usually limited to one or two
rooms, supplied with basic infrastructure such as electricity
connections. The core itself could be one mass-produced
concrete room, which can be made quickly by local contrac-
tors and distributed to target groups, or constructed on-site
using prefabricated components (GTZ used this technique
in prefabricating housing settlements in Azerbaijan in
1993–96; see Box 18). The design should allow the occu-
pants to expand the room according to various pre-planned
permutations. The assumption is that the inhabitants will be
satisfied with the new settlement, and will invest in devel-
oping it. This does not, of course, always happen, and build-
ings may not be extended as planned.
3. The choice of design
New housing stock can be designed with better ventilation
and water and sanitation provision than the original
housing stock. Reconstruction programmes and the finan-
cial assistance they help to generate can make possible
large-scale infrastructure improvements. However, the
starting-point in the design of houses must be to incorpo-
rate local forms of housing and to meet people’s aspira-
tions. Local construction forms reflect both the use to
which the house is put, and the cultural values attached to
it. A key factor is the size of the household. In many rural
communities, residence in extended families is still the
norm. Some consider this to be their cultural ideal, while
for others it is simply a fact of economic necessity. In both
cases, local housing design is likely to accommodate this
pattern through forms of subdivision that allow for privacy.
However, when it comes to reconstruction and for the sake
of efficiency, programmes often introduce a prototype
model, which is almost always based on the assumption of
occupancy by a nuclear family. This is likely to be problem-
atic; either the extended family lives in a house that is
inappropriate to its needs, or it breaks up into isolated
Although often seen as an intermediate measure for
displaced communities, in fact prefabricated housing
almost always ends up as the ultimate solution. In
October 1992, GTZ started constructing three settlements
in Karlovac, near Zagreb, Rokovci and Cepin in Eastern
Slovonia, to house some 9,600 people displaced from
Bosnia. A German–Turkish construction consortium was
contracted to build 1,600 housing units using
prefabricated, lightweight material. Each accommodated
six people. In addition, 14 social buildings (schools,
kindergartens, health stations and administrative
buildings) were constructed.
The units were provided in the form of 800 pairs of semi-
detached houses. Each pair came with a shared
bathroom, gas heating (centrally supplied) and basic
furniture. The programme provided over 50,000 square
metres of built space at a cost of €18.4m, or €349/m2.
The overall cost per accommodated refugee was almost
€2,000 (including administrative overheads).
Ten years after completion, the three settlements were all
still functioning, and in some cases had been extended
and partly planted. In one of the locations, a church and
an additional school were built. The unresolved question
of the refugees’ return to Bosnia and the general housing
shortage in the area made it necessary for these
settlements to be retained. What started as a ‘temporary’
settlement rapidly assumed a permanent appearance.34
Box 17
Prefabricated refugee settlements 
in Croatia
Following the break-up of the Soviet Union, hostilities
between Azerbaijan and Armenia led to the Armenian
army’s occupation of Nagorno-Karabakh, a region in
Azerbaijan mostly inhabited by Armenians; 1.4m people,
mainly Azeris, were displaced. 
Between 1993 and 1996, GTZ built 16 settlements with
3,280 prefabricated core houses (of two rooms each), for
a target population of 36,000. After tendering, the
prefabricated buildings were imported from Finland and
Turkey. The units were equipped with one lighting
connection and basic furniture. Ventilated pit latrines
were built on-site, and assigned to each housing unit.
Centrally-located communal washing and shower houses
were built to ‘minimum’ hygiene standards. The
identification phases of site locations for settlements
took place parallel to the planning and tendering
activities, and each lasted about a month. The
construction of the basic infrastructure as well as the
supply and construction of the prefabricated core houses
for each settlement took approximately four months; the
majority of the housing units were built before the onset
of winter. The overall cost of the project was €16.6m,
giving an average construction cost per accommodated
person of €600.
Box 18
Prefabricated core houses in Azerbaijan
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nuclear units (making older people and single mothers
particularly vulnerable). On the other hand, some families,
particularly young married couples living in extended
households as a result of economic pressure, may
welcome the opportunity to break away.35
Another major consideration is the way that space within
the house is used. In some cultures, spaces within the
household have various uses during the day and night,
and even according to season. The issue of sanitation and
the location of the lavatory or latrine are particularly sensi-
tive. Attempts to modernise the way communities live by
locating the lavatory inside the house must be resisted,
particularly in areas where there is no running water, or
where the local culture/religion dictates that toilets are
placed far from people’s homes. The risk of a mistake is
particularly acute in rural areas, and when houses have
been designed by architects/engineers coming from the
city who have a very different perception of the way the
house works. The house is also likely to have an important
economic function, or to have a key role in livelihoods. In
rural areas, this may require accommodation for livestock
and storage space for food and equipment. In urban areas,
space may be needed for a small workshop or for storing
goods to be sold in markets. Another dimension that
needs to be considered is the size of the plot, and whether
recipients of the new housing will be able to extend and
adapt it.
Attention also needs to be paid to the overall design of the
settlement. Local social, cultural and residential patterns
should as far as possible be reflected in the new settle-
ment design. Such patterns are likely to result from a
combination of factors, such as kinship and political rela-
tions, socio-economic status, the distribution of ethnic
groups, economic activities and access to supplies and
services such as water, roads, health and education.
Consideration should also be given to local patterns of
land use and tenure. Settlement design must accommo-
date the economic, social and religious needs of the
community. Communal buildings such as schools, health
centres, religious buildings and a marketplace may be
essential for the social wellbeing and development of the
community.
‘Building-yard’ approach
The philosophy behind this approach to reconstruction is
that affected communities are capable of rebuilding their
own houses, either by themselves or by contracting local
builders; outside help should seek to facilitate this
process by making sure that building materials and skills
are locally available at affordable prices, or free of
charge.
This approach is best implemented in rural and suburban
areas, where people are most likely still to build their own
homes as a matter of course. The focus is on developing
the production and distribution of building materials;
improving the quality of the materials; and training local
builders. It is particularly valuable in hazard areas where
building materials and construction techniques have
proved to be the main source of vulnerability, for instance
in earthquake zones. The strengths and weaknesses of
such an approach are well-illustrated by the Dhamar
Building Education Project in Yemen (see Box 20).
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Strengths
Possible to stockpile
Can be provided as components
Speed of construction
Can be used as transitional housing
May have alternative uses in the future
Weaknesses
Slow delivery
Inflexible
Culturally alien
Lacks individuality
High cost per unit
Transport is a problem (may require shipping, and may be
damaged during shipment)
Expensive to maintain
Requires skilled labour to assemble
Requires good foundations that may prove expensive
Appropriate to the climate?
Dangerous assumptions
Supplies will arrive on time
Construction will be fast
Routes will be open for transport
Little or no damage will occur during transport
People will adjust their ways of life to suit the design and structure of the prefabricated houses
People will soon gain control of their environment and start joint maintenance
Table 6 Prefabricated housing: strengths and weaknesses
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The Dhamar Building Education Project was initiated by
Oxfam, Concern and Redd Barna (Save The Children
Norway). The decision by these agencies to become
involved in building education was made on the basis of
their knowledge of local communities and cultures,
acquired during relief assistance programmes following
the 1982 earthquake. The project was distinctive in that it
was conceived as a process, rather than a product-
oriented programme. 
The aim of the project was to promote a set of simple
technical messages to local builders, who could then
incorporate these techniques into their normal
construction activities, with a view to assisting in the
reconstruction of safer houses. The improvements taught
were based on an analysis of the damage and on
investigation of existing construction methods.
Overall, the training methods used were considered
effective and made people more aware of bad
construction and vulnerability. Many buildings
incorporated improvements, and there was an impact on
the quality and safety of the building stock. However,
the overall effect of the programme was limited, for a
number of reasons. Training did not improve the
likelihood of employment, and it was difficult for
builders to find sustained work. Most people could not
afford to rebuild with new improvements, and many
were not rebuilding, but were waiting for government-
sponsored, contractor-built housing, promised 15
months earlier (see Box 25).
Lessons learnt include:
• A parallel programme of financing building
improvements would have improved the impact of the
project. Even minimum improvements were too
expensive for most.
• Coordination between ‘large’ governmental
reconstruction programmes and the building education
programme would have helped to address people’s
expectations.
• Accountability should be with the communities
themselves, which provided practically everything
(finance, material and labour) except for training
costs.37 
Box 20
Training local builders: the Dhamar Building Education Project in Yemen
GTZ implemented a ‘building yard’ approach in Jaffna
between 1996 and 2003, in collaboration with the
Resettlement and Rehabilitation Authority of the North
(RRAN) and the Sri Lankan government’s agent in Jaffna.
The objective was to make building material available
free of charge for families intending to rebuild their
homes and community schools.
• A central building yard was set up in Jaffna, which
acted both as a store and as a coordination point for
the programme.
• Building materials were procured, mainly from
Colombo.
• The construction of houses was generally carried
out by the families themselves.
• The construction of schools was carried out by
School Development Societies (teacher–parent
interest groups).
• The department of construction within the Ministry
of Education provided expert advice on rehabili-
tating schools.
• GTZ provided advice to families, and acted as the
overall coordinator.
The programme resulted in the reconstruction of 24
schools and 1,000 houses. There were, however, difficul-
ties around supplies due to increased levels of violence,
government restrictions on imports and occasional
looting.36
Box 19
Rehabilitating housing and schools for a returning population in Jaffna, Sri Lanka
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Finance facilitation
Like the building yard approach, finance facilitation is based
on the assumption that affected communities are fully
capable of planning and managing the rebuilding of their
own homes and recovering their livelihoods; building mate-
rials and skilled labour are available, but finance to buy them
is missing. Consequently, this approach argues that the most
effective intervention should provide finance and facilitating
loans to those who need to rebuild. The idea is to enhance
processes initiated by the community rather than to inter-
vene with parallel programmes. Following disaster and
conflict, external sources of funding for housing repair and
construction are often available, though much of the cost is
borne by the local authority and the survivors. Such an
approach helps to build on innate coping mechanisms and
supports community responses. In this way, intervention
does not duplicate community efforts and can instead be
concentrated on providing resources, such as technical
advice, which would otherwise not be available.
The first determining factor in this approach is an exami-
nation of how housing was financed before the disaster.
For example, was funding provided by the government, or
was it left to the market and private resources? If it was
the government, then where did the money come from?
Taxes? International grants and loans? Were any institu-
tions operating in the formal sector, offering loans and
certified by the authorities? These could include banks,
mutual societies and organisations established specifi-
cally to lend money for housing construction. Was there a
revolving fund (or bank) specifically dedicated to housing?
Was it successful? Was it affected by the war or the
disaster? Is it owed large amounts of money by its
borrowers? Is it capable of paying back pre-war or pre-
disaster loans? Is there a role for the international commu-
nity in strengthening such institutions and helping them to
continue supporting housing provision by enlarging their
activities to cope with the increased post-disaster
demand? How did the poor manage before the disaster?
What did they provide as collateral for their loans?
Locally, another determining factor is the level of commu-
nity assets. Few families have access to large amounts of
money in normal circumstances, never mind following a
disaster, but they may have savings or transportable assets
such as jewellery, carpets or a second property, which they
may be willing to sell. The majority of families build their
houses incrementally, and begin by stockpiling building
materials. Loans are often available through informal
networks, including family and friends. If documents are
not drawn up to record an agreement, repayment sched-
ules and interest rates will be agreed orally in detail.
There are many models available to determine how much
can be borrowed, and what the repayment schedule
should be. There are also models to forecast the costs of a
housing programme which take into account related over-
heads, such as planning, labour, infrastructure provision,
land, transport and legal costs, as well as the expenses
incurred through materials and labour. At the planning
stage, sources of funding, the size of the total budget, and
the overall costs need to be thoroughly examined to
ensure that adequate funds exist to cover all expenses,
and that the project is financially sustainable.38
Possible conduits for facilitating finance include interna-
tional and local NGOs, national governments, local author-
ities, traditional social structures such as village elders, or
a body established especially to coordinate the housing
reconstruction. Not all organisations will exist in every
situation, and some may be unsuitable for managing and
distributing funds. For example, after a civil war the
government may have collapsed, or may be seen to favour
one part of the population over another.
Central governments may find themselves having to inter-
vene directly. For example, following the devastation
caused by cyclones that hit Andhra Pradesh in India, the
central government ordered all Indian financial institutions
chapter 3  Approaches and technologies
Strengths
Builds on a community’s existing abilities
Helps with the availability of building materials
Can improve building materials
Can train builders
Can help develop small contractors
Weaknesses
Giving building materials free of charge may cause problems for
the local market
Materials may be resold and not used in construction
Stockpiles may be looted
It takes a long time to see results
Difficult to justify for funding agencies
Difficult to target beneficiaries
Dangerous assumptions
All the trained builders will remain in the area
People will take responsibility
People will be able to afford to invest in building improvements without outside financial help
Table 7 The ‘building yard’ approach
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and commercial banks to increase the number of loans
they provided for affected communities by relaxing their
qualifying requirements. The state subsidised a third of
these loans through its Housing and Urban Development
Corporation (HUDCO), which also financed the construc-
tion of infrastructure.
Donors can encourage participation and increase the
sense of responsibility and ownership among target
groups by distributing assistance at a community level.
This can take many forms, including financial aid, mate-
rials, labour, expertise, food for work, or a wage to inhab-
itants while they rebuild their homes. Assistance may be
distributed at a family or a community level. At the family
level, it can be tailored to meet individual needs. To
ensure that financial assistance is used for its intended
purpose, vouchers can be issued to exchange for goods
at designated shops or distribution centres. If the recon-
struction takes place at community level, finance or
assistance is given to the community as a whole. This is
usually delivered in phases to ensure that all members of
the community, including the vulnerable, benefit.
Subsequent phases of assistance can be
delayed or withheld if people are being
neglected by their community. If one
member fails to honour agreements
made with the donor and implementing
agencies, the whole community may be
penalised.39
Assistance can be provided uncondition-
ally and without expectation of repay-
ment. However, it is generally considered
preferable to establish a clear agreement
with the target group and arrange some
form of repayment. Repayment can be in
kind as well as financial. One possibility is
for assistance to be provided on condition
that members of the target group commit
themselves to provide labour to recon-
struct community centres such as schools
and heath centres.
Repayments for financial assistance can be structured so
that they are manageable for poorer families and vulner-
able groups. Micro-credit programmes have demonstrated
that the poor are credit-worthy and can be given credit
without collateral.40 Interest rates can be low, or no
interest need be charged at all. Soft loans are composed
of a grant and a loan, so only a proportion of the financial
assistance received needs to be repaid. In Mexico
following the 1985 earthquake, beneficiaries had to make
an initial down-payment of 10% of the cost of their new
home. Subsequent repayments were structured according
to family income, and were calculated on an individual
basis.41
Sustainability and technology transfer
Whatever the housing reconstruction approach chosen, it
must be sustainable: financial, material and technical
resources must be available locally to maintain the
housing in a good state of repair. The housing must be
appropriate to the needs of the family, suitable to the local
environment and located in an area where there is employ-
Strengths
It builds on communities’ abilities
It makes finance more readily available
Can offer opportunities to poorer communities
Helps build financial systems
Grants can be tied to a building improvement and strengthening
programme
Weaknesses
Money may not be used for construction
Loans may be difficult to repay
Increases indebtedness amongst the poor
Dangerous assumptions
Money will be used to construct houses
People can afford to borrow more money
Building skills and materials are available in the local market
Table 8 Facilitating finance approach
These homes, built following the Dhamar earthquake in Yemen in 1982, did
not meet the target community’s needs and were eventually abandoned
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ment and where services are adequate to the needs of the
occupants. If there is no work and there are no facilities,
people will move, abandoning their new homes.
As it may not be possible to locate housing away from
disaster-prone areas, building techniques and evacuation
plans which mitigate the effects of a disaster have to be
considered. Mitigation methods are wide and varied:
designing disaster-resistant houses or retroactively
altering existing ones so that they can withstand future
disasters; introducing building codes and regulations
where none previously existed; establishing an institu-
tional body to implement building codes; reducing envi-
ronmental degradation; or developing an education
programme to help communities minimise the effects of
disasters. Whichever methods are chosen, they too need
to be sustainable.
The five key characteristics of sustainable housing are: 
• Environmental sustainability – does the chosen
approach avoid depleting natural resources and
contaminating the environment?
• Technical sustainability – can the requisite skills be
introduced and passed on to others, and are the neces-
sary tools accessible?
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After a disaster, a decision needs to be made whether to
relocate and rebuild in a new area, or to rebuild on the same
site. There may be sound psychological and physical reasons
for moving away: it represents a fresh start in an area not
tinged with trauma and loss, for example, or it may remove
an important factor in the community’s physical vulnerability
to disaster. This is not, however, a decision to be taken
lightly; people may be attached to a particular site for an
array of powerful social, cultural and economic reasons, and
the cultural, symbolic and historical significance of the
damaged site cannot easily be transferred to a new area.
Indeed, returning to a particular area, even if it is still
demonstrably unsafe, may be an act of defiance or an
attempt to heal psychological hurt. Settlements do not
spring up arbitrarily, and there are usually good reasons why
a community settles in one place rather than another. These
may be positive: access to a trading route or important
natural resources, for example. Or they may be negative:
poor people may have little choice but to settle in a
particular location, for instance if landowners have expelled
them from more viable areas. If the latter, proposals to
relocate may well confront the interests of powerful local
players, or safer land may be unavailable.
Findings from UN shelter projects from the mid-1970s to
the early 1980s indicate a strong preference among
survivors for remaining as close as possible to their homes
and means of livelihood, and strong opposition to forced
evacuation (of the eight alternatives described,
compulsory evacuation ranked eighth, below tent
accommodation in emergency campsites).42 This suggests
that, unless there is a serious, irreducible thereat to the
original location, forced migration to another site is not
desirable. Any new site should at the least have the
benefits of the original one.43
Nevertheless, relocation may be desirable or inevitable in
some situations:
• the new settlement is sufficiently close to the old one
that people can retain their existing livelihood
patterns;
• damaging events, with high losses, continue to
threaten the original area;
• the disaster event has rendered the area simply
uninhabitable, or the after-effects of a conflict – the
presence of unexploded ordnance, for instance –
present unacceptable risks;
• measures to reduce the risk are too costly and difficult
to implement;
• the continuing psychological impact of the event(s)
associated with the original site might be
insupportable for the community, or the surviving
community might regard the area as a burial ground
and therefore sacred, and so inappropriate for
reconstruction or resettlement.
• considerable decline, due to environmental
degradation, pollution or economic change, has
occurred in the pre-disaster period; or
• relocation is part of a peace settlement, or other
political factors are at work.44 A peace agreement
might redistribute land for political reasons, or
reallocate certain areas to different ethnic groups. If
the housing destroyed in a disaster belonged to illegal
squatters, governments may use the opportunity to
prevent the area from being resettled.
For some, displacement or migration following conflict or
disaster may result in exposure to new experiences, which
then make people reluctant to return when the
opportunity to do so arises. Many of the refugees who fled
from rural to urban areas during the Yugoslav wars found
city life easier than their former life in the countryside, and
were unwilling to return home after the war.45 In
Afghanistan, significant numbers used the disruption
caused by war to leave their rural homes and move to the
cities.46
Box 21
Relocation or reconstruction on the same site?
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In the wake of disastrous floods in Vietnam in November
1998, the IFRC and the Vietnamese Red Cross developed
more robust housing to cope with high winds and flooding.
Units were 12–18 metres square, with a robust two-storey
galvanized steel frame. There was provision for households
to store valuable belongings and food reserves on the
second floor, above the level of flooding. Even if the walls
and extensions are swept away, families retain the basic
structure of their house and stored belongings. 
The design is disaster-resistant because of:
• Strong foundations – made of concrete and prepared
using a template to produce accurate measurements.
• A wind-resistant roof – clips designed to resist high
winds were used to attach the metal sheets of the roof
together. The roof is angled at 30 degrees, which is the
optimum angle to withstand typhoon-force winds.
• Strong connections – the roof and house frame were
attached together with 12mm steel bolts. The frame
and foundations were attached with steel anchor balls.
• Strong bracing and frame.
Only one out of the 2,450 houses built using this design
succumbed to floods in 1999. 
Nonetheless, the project has been criticised. The target
group was excluded from the design process. The technical
aspects of the design were not explained during the
construction, so the features that make the houses
disaster-resistant are not understood and cannot be copied
or incorporated into repairs, extensions or new buildings.
Although the materials are available nationally, they are
not available locally so communities are dependent on
outside suppliers; materials are expensive, and the cost is
beyond most families.
Box 22
Disaster mitigation in Vietnam
Straw bale housing was pioneered in Belarus and other
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) countries to
provide affordable, environmentally-sustainable public
housing for groups displaced following the Chernobyl
nuclear accident in 1986. Because of the poor regional
economy and the target groups’ lack of financial resources,
it was imperative that the housing should be inexpensive.
A sustainable approach was also desirable because of the
environmental problems caused by Chernobyl and by
military activities in the area. The programme, undertaken
jointly by a Belarusian NGO and the government, is
regarded as successful. It is sustainable for the following
reasons: 
• Ease of construction and maintenance. Straw bale
construction methods are simple, and most people are
capable of building their own home with the help of
friends and family. In the US, with normal maintenance,
bale houses have lasted for over 80 years. With today’s
improved knowledge and materials, the lifespan of bale
housing should be increased. Bale housing has passed
rigorous tests for fire safety and structural stability. As
an insulating material, straw is safer than many
synthetic alternatives, and the structures have
performed better in earthquakes than conventional
structures.
• Available materials. The raw material is a by-product of
grain production, which occurs in most populated areas
of the world. Therefore, the construction material is
readily available and transport costs are low.
• Economic sustainability. Straw bale houses are three to
four times cheaper than brick houses because labour
costs are minimal and materials cheap. Using straw for
building converts what is usually a worthless waste
product into a commodity, thereby providing additional
income for agricultural producers, solving housing
shortages at minimum expense, and conserving scarce
financial resources for other kinds of economic
development.
• Environmental sustainability. Straw is an annually
renewable agricultural waste product which is often
burned because it is difficult to reintegrate with the
soil. Straw burning is now banned in some countries,
such as the UK. Using straw instead of wood helps to
curb deforestation. Straw is a good soundproofing and
insulating material. Inhabitants of straw bale housing
report that they use four times less fuel than in a
conventional brick house. Each bale house uses solar
power for hot water and heating between April and
September.
• Social sustainability. Bale housing can easily be
modified to suit local cultural traditions.47
Box 23
Sustainable straw bale housing, Belarus, 1994–2000
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• Financial sustainability – can money or service
exchange be accessed to pay for the work that needs
to be done?
• Organisational sustainability – is there a structure to
bring together the different stakeholders without, for
example, needing to call on outside expertise on each
occasion?
• Social sustainability – does the overall process and
product fit within, and satisfy, the needs of the
society?48
Housing reconstruction programmes can be used to intro-
duce new technology (this is known as technology
transfer), for instance as part of a disaster mitigation
strategy, to ease the burden of cleaning and maintenance
or to provide better-quality water and sanitation.
Technology transfer is, however, a controversial issue.
Housing developed by Western engineers to be disaster-
resistant or provide what they consider a higher standard
of living is likely to be more expensive to build and
maintain than traditional housing. The local community
may understand the benefits of the imported design, but
be unable to afford it. Other materials and traditional
building techniques may be used for repairs, creating
hybrid constructions more dangerous than the original
locally-inspired housing.49 Housing which is not based on
local skills or materials may not greatly benefit the local
economy. Traditional building techniques can be lost,
especially if skills and materials are imported and the new
structures are beyond the means of the local community
to maintain without outside help.
All cultures have developed adequate and affordable
housing solutions; if these are used as a starting-point,
appropriate housing would be easier and cheaper to
provide.50 Technology transfer has to be appropriate,
sustainable and acceptable to the target community.
Efforts to introduce flood-resistant housing in
Bangladesh after the 1988 floods failed largely because
outreach was poor, the housing designs had not been
tested and most people could not afford the housing.
Assistance provided after floods a decade later recog-
nised the failure of earlier attempts, and concentrated
instead on micro-credit and other non-structural forms of
livelihood support.51
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Once the approach or range of approaches has been
chosen and the planning completed, the next step is to
decide on the method of implementation. There are,
broadly speaking, two options: a contractor model and a
self-build model. Which is chosen will depend on a
number of factors:
• The scale and spread of destruction and the size of the
settlement. The larger the project, the greater the like-
lihood of employing contractors. 
• Building methods in the target region and the technical
complexity of construction; the more complex the
scheme, the more likely it is to employ contractors.
• Whether housing prior to the disaster was generally
provided by self-help construction, and whether basic
construction techniques are widely known.
• Capacities of the stakeholders (technical, economic,
organisational), particularly when it comes to intro-
ducing mitigation measures.
• The amount of time and effort the target population is
willing to invest in the reconstruction.
• The timeframe of the project.
The contractor model
Housing reconstruction programmes can be contracted to
professional construction companies. Companies, solu-
tions, materials and expertise are often imported from
outside the target community. This method is chosen
because it is considered the easiest and quickest way to
provide housing, return the community to normality and
protect communities composed of large numbers of vulner-
able people. However, imposed solutions are difficult to
adapt to emergency situations aimed at assisting commu-
nities in the aftermath of disaster. Furthermore, large-scale
contracted construction tends to adopt a ‘one-size-fits-all’
approach, which means that the specific housing needs of
individual communities are not met and diversity within the
community is not taken into consideration. 
In some post-conflict/post-disaster situations, elements
of housing reconstruction programmes might have to use
imposed solutions to avert further human suffering. If
imported technology and expertise is necessary to provide
more durable or disaster-resistant housing than traditional
constructions, the technology must be appropriate so that
communities have the funds and the skills to maintain
buildings safely without outside help. Generally speaking,
imposed solutions are considered undesirable because of
their top-down approach; though they tend to suit donors
and implementing agencies, they seldom involve the
active participation of the target community.
The advantages of using construction companies are that
large numbers of houses with standard specifications can
be constructed relatively quickly using staff with technical
expertise, employing specialist skills. In developed coun-
tries or urban areas, where skills have become
specialised, knowledge of construction is limited to
professionals, and there is no longer a tradition of commu-
nity self-building. In these circumstances, using firms to
undertake reconstruction is usually preferable. Contract
builders are also appropriate when target groups are
vulnerable and lack the skills or resources to undertake
the building work themselves.
In developing countries or rural areas, the use of large,
perhaps international contractors on post-
conflict/disaster housing reconstruction can force
smaller local companies and traders out of business.
Experience has shown that much of the physical damage
following a disaster or conflict (with the exception of
major power plants, dams and in some cases bridges)
can be repaired by the local construction industry. It is,
however, true that the construction industry, particularly
in the wake of conflict, can emerge divided and
weakened, especially in situations where there has been
a political split in the country and where the industry is
expected to go through a transition from public to
private ownership (as in the Former Yugoslavia and
Iraq). Nevertheless, the human resources and know-how
are usually there, and they can be helped to reorganise
and engage in the reconstruction process. Bypassing
them by using international contractors means that the
primary beneficiaries are the economies of donor coun-
tries, large firms and other regions outside the target
area.
If local communities are accustomed to building their own
homes, contracting the job to a company may be unneces-
sary. In some instances, small local contractors that
employ and source materials locally can be engaged to
undertake the work. Contracting local NGOs is a wide-
spread practice in war- and disaster-affected areas. This
may be justified in the short term, when skills are limited
and the private construction industry is not functioning
well. In the medium to long term, however, it may lead to
competition between NGOs and small private contractors.
This is particularly problematic in areas where an ‘NGO
culture’ has not taken root, and NGO work is misinter-
preted as ‘private business’ (i.e. a surreptitious way of
making a profit and hiding it).
Using outside contractors in countries where homeowners
expect to carry out their own repairs is problematic
because there is a risk of introducing technology, skills
and building techniques alien to the local community (see
the discussion of technology transfer in the previous
chapter). Once the project is completed, the inhabitants
may be unable to maintain the house properly. This forces
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them to compromise on materials and can lead to
dangerous building practices, as modifications are made
without understanding the implications for safety.
Contractors can fail to complete on time and meet all their
contractual requirements. It is imperative that contracts
have clear and enforceable penalties for missing target
dates and for poor-quality work. In countries where the
rule of law has been maintained, writing a binding contract
should not pose problems, nor should open tendering.
However, in contexts where the rule of law is less robust,
after or amid a conflict for instance, it may be difficult to
enforce legally-binding contracts. Yet the absence of
rigorous juridical procedures does not mean that work can
be carried out without contracts, or even that contracts
can be awarded without transparent tendering. This is
particularly important in housing reconstruction as it
affects the social and economic balance of the locality.
In general, lump-sum contracts should be avoided, and
more detailed contracts based on measurable achieve-
ments should be devised and employed. Such contracts
would preserve the rights of both sides. Another idea is to
encourage competition between a number of contractors in
terms of targets, which helps to avoid one or two contrac-
tors monopolising the market or organising themselves
into a cartel. Contractors are more likely to act responsibly
in a competitive environment. The likely steps envisaged in
any contracting procedure are set out in Box 24.
However, it is important to be realistic when drawing up
terms of reference (ToRs) for reconstruction programmes.
For example, agencies drawing up ToRs must keep in mind
the amount of time contractors (especially international
1. Draft an initial tender describing the work that is
required.
2. Gather information on local contractors (through, for
instance, visits to companies and associations or
interviews).
3. Draw up a shortlist of contractors qualified to
undertake the work.
4. Despatch tender documents to all those who qualify.
5. Construction companies submit tenders (a specific
date should be given).
6. Tenders are opened (in public or by a representative
committee).
7. Tenders are analysed.
8. A proposal is made for awarding contracts and
documentation.
9. A decision is taken on awarding the contract.
10. The contract is negotiated (it may be necessary to
review some items, such as the bill of quantities, or
planning and execution documents).
11. Construction begins.52
Box 24
Tendering and contracting procedures
Just after midday on 13 December 1982, an earthquake
measuring 5.8 on the Richter scale struck Dhamar Province
and adjacent areas in Yemen. The earthquake affected
354,000 people over more than 1,000 small and medium-
sized settlements, killing 2,500 and injuring 4,800. Across
the province, some 25,000 houses were destroyed, and a
further 18,000 developed serious cracks. Six months later,
on 1 May 1983, the Yemeni government, represented by the
newly-established Supreme Council for the Reconstruction
of Earthquake Affected Areas (SCREAA), announced that it
was to pursue an ambitious programme of tendering,
employing national and international contractors to rebuild
and repair all the lost houses within two years. 
By November 1991, nearly a decade on, what had started as
a two-year programme had still not ended. Just under 10,300
houses had been built and a further 1,652 repaired. The
following were some of the reasons given for the delay:
• Tendering and contracting alone took 15 months.
• The mountainous nature of Dhamar Province and its
poor road access meant that only small four-wheel-
drive vehicles could be used to transport materials.
• Many roads had to be specially built to reach some
isolated settlements and to allow contractors’ heavy
equipment to be transported.
• International contractors had failed to anticipate many
of the cultural and logistical problems they were going
to face in a very conservative society.
• The 447 construction sites were spread over a huge
area, which made supervision difficult, slow and
expensive. Planners attempted to reduce the number of
sites by grouping smaller villages into larger
conglomerations.
• The selection of beneficiaries proved to be a prolonged
process.
• Tribal differences over new construction locations and
the number of promised houses led to several armed
conflicts that further delayed the work.
• The Executive Office for Reconstruction established to
supervise the work on behalf of the SCREAA lacked
relevant experience in large-scale housing programmes
and failed to coordinate activities with other ministries. 
• Finally, building suppliers were unable to cope with the
competing demands of 17 large contractors.53
Box 25
Contractor-build reconstruction in Yemen
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ones) need to establish themselves locally. They should
also anticipate the difficulties contractors are going to face
in terms of procuring building expertise and materials. The
potential pitfalls of an unrealistic and overly ambitious
contracting approach are illustrated clearly by the Yemeni
case study in Box 25, where construction was still in
progress over a decade after the original earthquake.
The self-build model 
This model – often also called self-help or owner-driven –
focuses on enabling communities to undertake building
work themselves. Self-build is possible when labour is
available, housing design is relatively simple, communi-
ties have a tradition of self-building and there are no strict
time pressures. Reconstruction work can be organised on
a family self-help basis or as a joint community reconstruc-
tion programme. Outside support is mostly given through
supplying building materials and expert advice (essen-
tially similar to the building-yard and finance facilitation
approaches described in the last chapter). In other situa-
tions, materials may be delivered to target groups or
official warehouses, from where families can request
materials (if families have access to transport, estab-
lishing a warehouse may be a more cost-effective option
than delivering materials directly to the target commu-
nity). Food for work may also be included as part of the
programme.
In addition to labour, the target group in a self-build
project may contribute financially to the cost of the
project. This may have important benefits for the local
economy, though it does also raise questions around the
degree of assistance poorer sections of a community
should receive to enable them to participate in the self-
build programme; it should not be assumed that rela-
tives will automatically help. Overall, costs may be lower:
Norwegian People’s Aid estimates that self-build projects
in Mostar were 30% cheaper than contractor-build
ones.54
Although self-build tends to be slower
than contractor-build, this may not always
be the case. Contractor-build is seasonally
dependent and more likely to be impeded
by failures in the supply of materials, and
houses usually must be completed before
they can be occupied. By contrast, families
can build their own homes incrementally,
allowing occupation before the house is
fully finished. Moreover, contractor-built
housing is produced on a large scale to
standard specifications, which might not
meet the needs of individual families. 
Contractors usually produce technically
superior housing than self-build construc-
tions, though occupancy rates are typi-
cally higher with the latter. Concerns over
the safety of self-build will be greater in
disaster-prone areas, where traditional
construction practices have led to a large number of build-
ings collapsing. In Gujarat, poor building practices made a
significant contribution to the damage and loss of life
caused by the 2001 earthquake. Building codes can be
supplied to improve the quality of self-build, and agencies
undertaking these projects can provide advice and
oversee the construction process, to ensure safe building
practices. This was done in Gujarat in 2001, though the
evidence from this project suggests that such newly-
constructed self-build housing was not necessarily safer.
Monitoring is important to ensure that distributed mate-
rials are not resold. Monitoring and evaluation of self-build
can, however, be more expensive than with contractor-
build.55
A self-build approach may have less tangible, though still
important, benefits. Since it encourages the active partici-
pation of the disaster-affected community, it may be a
useful way of restoring a sense of pride and well-being in
people who have been through a trauma. Building activi-
ties provide structure to the day and, because it is a
labour-intensive approach, it can keep larger numbers of
people gainfully occupied than contractor-build. There
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In Goma, technical advice enabled local people to rebuild their homes
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The authorities in Gujarat adopted an owner-driven
approach to assist communities made homeless by the
2001 earthquake. The government provided financial
compensation and subsidised building materials, but left
homeowners to repair or construct their own houses.
NGOs provided technical advice about safe building
practices.56
Box 26
Owner-driven housing reconstruction 
in Gujarat
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may also be opportunities to establish or strengthen new
ties within the community through shared participation.
UNHCR adopted a self-build model in Bosnia in 1996 and
1997. However, the agency had reservations about this
approach. It concluded that the ability of individuals to
repair their own homes depended on the extent of the
damage, and fewer community members than expected
had the building skills needed to tackle the reconstruc-
tion. This suggests that the planning for self-help projects
should include an assessment of community skills to
undertake the work. According to UNHCR, the quality of
some of the repair work was poor; as much as 60% of the
budget allocated for repairs was spent on preventing
further deterioration to houses, rather than preparing
them for habitation.
Cooperative reconstruction
An alternative to self-help housing is to mobilise a commu-
nity to undertake reconstruction together. This means that
materials are provided for the community as a whole,
rather than for individual families. Reconstruction is
undertaken for the entire community.
As with self-build, cooperative reconstruction strengthens
community relations, contributes to reconciliation and
facilitates psychological recovery following disaster and
conflict. In addition, this approach ensures a more even
distribution of skills and labour throughout the commu-
nity, and guarantees help for vulnerable people. This
means that they will not have to rely on extra agency assis-
tance or on privately-arranged help from family and
On 30 September 1993, an earthquake struck the Indian
state of Maharashtra, killing about 8,000 people and
damaging some 230,000 houses in Latur, Osmanabad and
11 other districts. With the help of the World Bank, the
government of Maharashtra created the Maharashtra
Emergency Earthquake Rehabilitation Program (MEERP).
The MEERP divided communities into two categories:
those that needed to be relocated (the 52 villages that
sustained the worst damage) and those that needed their
homes to be reconstructed, repaired or strengthened, but
on the same site. The latter category comprised around
1,500 villages and some 190,000 families.
In the relocation sites, housing construction was organised
by engineering consultants and contractors, except in a
few smaller villages, which were handled by donor
organisations and NGOs. While the beneficiaries were not
directly involved in construction, they were heavily
engaged in the decision-making stages, including the
selection of beneficiaries, the identification of relocation
sites, the layout of the village, the design of houses and
the provision of amenities. Final decisions were taken in
plenary meetings of the whole village. During the
construction stage, only the village-level committee and
community participation consultants were involved with
the project management unit. Once the construction was
completed, houses were allotted to beneficiaries in an
open consultation with the entire village.
In communities slated for reconstruction or repair,
homeowners took on the responsibility of repairing,
retrofitting and strengthening their houses, with materials
and financial and technical assistance provided by the
government. The project management unit opened a bank
account for each of the 190,000 eligible homeowners, who
received coupons for construction materials. A junior
engineer appointed at the village level provided technical
assistance to ensure that the houses were earthquake-
resistant. Each village formed a beneficiary committee to
work with the project management unit. In most villages,
these committees consisted of women’s self-help groups.
Training programmes were organised in villages with large
numbers of beneficiaries, where residents were informed
of their entitlements and the processes to be followed.
After 18 months, the programme was in full swing. With
such a large number of villages and beneficiaries involved,
it took on the dimensions of a housing movement,
renewing the housing stock in the entire area.
As the MEERP progressed and results materialised,
community participation became increasingly accepted as
an effective method for resolving problems during the
reconstruction process. It also had a positive effect on
communities insofar as involving local people helped them
to overcome their trauma. In addition to housing work,
some agencies also tackled social issues, such as
schooling. Over time, the MEERP became a people’s
project. The participatory process opened many informal
channels of communication between ordinary people and
the government. Beneficiaries became aware of their
entitlements and worked hard within the process to secure
them. Individuals who felt that their grievances were not
addressed appropriately at local level approached the
district authorities and the government in Mumbai.
Box 27
Community participation: lessons from the Maharashtra earthquake rehabilitation 
programme
friends. This approach requires a high level of community
involvement and cooperation – it may be unsuitable for
post-conflict communities. To succeed, cooperative recon-
struction must be carefully organised and managed; rela-
tions between the community and implementing agencies
must be good; and a programme’s objectives and
construction targets must be clearly agreed before any
construction takes place. Agencies can maintain some
control over the process and ensure community members
are benefiting equally by providing materials in phases.
Handover and maintenance
There are two aspects involved in handing over recon-
structed housing units. The first is to do with handing over
‘keys’ or ownership of properties to beneficiaries. The
procedure here will involve issuing ownership and tenure
certificates and guarantees of title. The second aspect
involves handing over projects to partners or local authori-
ties, who then become responsible for running and main-
taining programmes, and in some cases seeing projects
through to completion.
It is important to remember that many newly-built settle-
ments lack the social fabric that may have existed prior to
the disaster event, and therefore require additional care in
terms of maintenance and services, particularly when it
comes to communal spaces, installations and infrastructure.
Local partners may also be required to set up mechanisms
and systems to recover the cost of reconstruction. In other
cases, they may be needed to organise the letting of build-
ings and managing the tenants. In some programmes, partic-
ularly large-scale ones, in projects where there has been a
high degree of collective participation from the community,
or where the government has been heavily engaged, the
handover may be quite formal; there may even be an event
to mark the occasion, with attendant media coverage.
Local management groups may be elected from among the
beneficiaries themselves, they may be subcontracted or
they may be from local government. Whichever model is
used, there will probably need to be a period of transition
before they are fully capable of taking over a housing
project. This is particularly important where new manage-
ment systems and technologies have been introduced. At
the same time, there is always a danger that, if an agency
assumes responsibility for a housing programme, its name
is always going to be linked with that programme, in some
cases leaving the public confused about its long-term role.
In Mexico, the Red Cross has often found itself being
blamed for problems arising after it had handed over a
project to local authorities and inhabitants’ committees.58
This may be less of a problem if the programme is imple-
mented using the self-help approach. 
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In the Balkans, adopting a self-help approach to housing
reconstruction was an appropriate response: people were
used to building their own homes with the help of family
and friends, and accustomed to hiring skilled labour to
complete technically difficult aspects of the construction.
Mainly through self-help, SIDA financed repairs and major
reconstruction to 6,400 houses in Bosnia, 850 in Croatia
and more than 1,300 in Kosovo.
SIDA concluded that:
• Self-build projects were 40% cheaper than contractor-
build ones.
• People were concerned about the quality of
construction and took pride in their work. Many
preferred to do the work themselves because they did
not trust contractors to do as good a job.
• Agencies should have personnel capable of providing
technical advice, but construction standards should be
left to the homeowner. 
• Some municipalities, possibly for political reasons,
argued that self-build houses were constructed
illegally. The authorities sought to charge inhabitants
retrospectively for permits. Large contractors were in a
stronger position to negotiate legal issues with the
authorities. If agencies emphasise and closely monitor
building standards, this can give the authorities
opportunities to obstruct housing construction and
reoccupancy.
• In Bosnia, occupancy rates for new self-build projects
were 10% higher than with similar contractor-build
housing located in the same area, constructed over the
same time-span and implemented by the same NGO.
• NGOs should make it clear from the beginning of the
project that they will reclaim unused materials. This
ensures that resources are used effectively and
reduces the risk that they will simply be sold on.
However, agencies need to be flexible about
completion times because some families will work
more slowly than others.
Even vulnerable members of the community, including
households headed by women, managed to participate in
self-build projects by securing help from relatives and
friends. The process of self-build is more challenging for
the community than contractor-build, but the social
benefits are far greater. Several municipal leaders claimed
to prefer self-help projects for this reason.57
Box 28
Self-help housing in the Balkans, 1993–2000: SIDA’s experience
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In 1983, an earthquake caused widespread damage in the
Colombian city of Popayan, destroying almost three-
quarters of the housing stock. Nearly 2,500 houses were
completely destroyed, 6,900 seriously damaged and 4,500
moderately affected. The earthquake affected many
commercial and public buildings and the city’s
infrastructure. Three hundred people lost their lives, and
2,000 were injured.
Between 1985 and 1995, SENA (Servicio Nacional de
Aprendizaje – The National Training Service) reconstructed
and repaired 5,000 houses using a self-help model. Each
community involved was organised into ‘modules’, which
consisted of groups of 15–20 families, under the direction of
a board made up of a chairman, a treasurer and a secretary,
all elected by the community. In some modules, monitors
were selected on the basis of special skills or interests.
There was a different funding scheme for each community,
appropriate to its particular characteristics and needs. In
some cases, loans were used to pay for work, while in others
the community received donations as a percentage of the
cost of building materials. The remainder of the cost was
made up from people’s own savings and credit from
government building societies or from other special funds
established to provide credit for the reconstruction process.
In 1986, an impact assessment of the first stage of the
programme, covering 524 families, was conducted. Its
findings included:
• Most participants in the reconstruction were aged
between 30 and 49 years; 80% were men.
• Before the earthquake struck, over half – 57% – were
in employment; 10% were unemployed and 17%
(roughly equivalent to the proportion of female
participants) worked on household tasks. The rest
were students or did other activities. Half of the
participants in employment worked in the building
industry.
• At the time of the survey, just over 51% of participants
who had loans were up to date with their payments,
24% were not and the rest did not answer the
question.
• Around 87% of participants were occupying the houses
that they had built, 3% had rented them out and 10%
had sold them.
• Most of those who rented or sold their houses were in
the lower-income group.
• Roughly 84% were satisfied with the size and design of
their houses, and the building materials used.
• More than 60% of the houses were unaltered at the
time of the survey. Of those that had been modified,
most had had either extra rooms built, or had been
adapted for specific purposes, such as making the
living room into a shop.
• Finally, despite the low level of formal education, 70%
gave correct answers to questions about basic
earthquake-resistant building principles.59
Box 29
Self-help reconstruction in Colombia
When housing is destroyed in a conflict or disaster, its
physical loss undermines many aspects of daily life, with a
profound negative effect on the community. Given the
importance of housing, it might be expected that housing
reconstruction would form a core activity of the response.
Yet housing has a low profile on the humanitarian agenda,
notwithstanding its links with humanitarian concerns to do
with security, health and the maintenance of privacy and
dignity.
This paper has suggested that the low profile of housing
reconstruction in the immediate post-conflict and post-
disaster period lies at least in part in its peculiar position
between ‘relief’ and ‘development’ work; agency
mandates and interests may not accommodate housing
reconstruction, and funding parameters and timeframes
can militate against it. At a practical level, housing recon-
struction may simply be beyond many agencies’ capacities
or resources: it can be a complex, expensive, multi-disci-
plinary and highly technical area, and there may be signifi-
cant logistical, legal or political obstacles. 
Housing design needs to be sensitive to people’s cultural or
religious needs, their expectations about the proper
function of housing and their social requirements.
Potentially difficult choices need to be made around mate-
rials, approach and implementation, financing, legality and
the extent of community participation and management. To
be successful and sustainable, housing needs to be located
in areas where there is employment and access to facilities.
If it is not, then the reconstruction programme will also need
to include income-generation activities, ensuring access to
services, and the provision of infrastructure, in addition to
the housing itself. In areas where there are few local
resources, access is poor and little outside help is available,
housing reconstruction on a large scale may be unrealistic,
and other methods of assistance should be examined.
Guiding principles 
The following set of guiding principles, whilst not exhaus-
tive, is intended as a useful checklist to help inform
decision-making around reconstruction programmes.
• Housing reconstruction is pivotal for the overall social
and economic recovery of war- or disaster-affected
countries and communities.
• A housing intervention in the emergency phase will
affect longer-term housing provision; experience indi-
cates that temporary solutions have a tendency to
become permanent.
• Solutions need to be sensitive to cultural considera-
tions. Agencies should try to avoid standard, one-size-
fits-all approaches. Even when, for cost reasons, a
decision is made to supply core housing, for example,
there should be sufficient flexibility in the design to
ensure that structures can be adapted and moulded to
meet a variety of cultural needs and expectations. 
• Housing is multi-faceted; a house is not simply a place
of residence, but may also be a workplace and a means
of conferring social status and standing in a commu-
nity. Involvement in reconstruction can help to
encourage local skills and industry, re-establish social
networks and relationships and promote psychological
recovery.
• Housing reconstruction should be regarded as a
process; it is about far more than a physical product.
Working with communities is as important as providing
them with ready-made solutions.
• Reconstruction should aim to achieve a balance between
reform and improvement and the conservation or preser-
vation of the status quo. There is a need to guard against
overly optimistic reform agendas. Too much change, in
settlement layout, technology or location, for instance,
could have unforeseen consequences.
• Housing reconstruction is potentially a highly political
process because of the extent and scale of the
resources involved and the impact this work has on
people’s lives. This political dimension is especially
acute after disasters and (especially) conflict, particu-
larly where communities have been forcibly displaced
for ethnic or political reasons. Great care needs to be
taken over issues such as beneficiary selection and the
location of the project.
• Reconstruction activities need to pay particular atten-
tion to the social and economic make-up of a settle-
ment. Ill-thought-through decisions can weaken or
destroy a community; the use of houses designed for
nuclear rather than extended families, for instance,
may end up splitting such extended groups into
smaller units.
• Reconstruction should be predicated on active, two-
way participation between beneficiary communities
and reconstruction agencies/authorities at all levels. If
it is to be successful, community participation has to
be an integral and foundational component of a
project’s design, not simply a politically correct,
cosmetic add-on.
All actors involved need to develop a critical awareness of
the ‘enemies of reconstruction’. These include: the
assumption that housing reconstruction is a straightfor-
ward activity for which no specialist knowledge or experi-
ence is needed; opportunistic politicians; agencies that
act without reference to local structures and institutions;
commercial firms wanting to make a quick profit from
‘mega-solutions’; and a focus on the technical/engi-
neering aspects of safe building without due consideration
for people’s abilities and capacities to maintain, develop
and enhance their homes.
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